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CLYDE W. SUMMERSt 
When the first Roosevelt was considering appointing Holmes to the Su? 
preme Court, he wrote to Senator Lodge: "Now I should like to know that 
Judge Holmes was in entire sympathy with our views .... absolutely sane 
and sound on the great national policies for which we stand in public life."1 
The second Roosevelt needed to make no such inquiries before appointing 
a successor to the "Holmes chair." Professor Frankfurter was not only "sane 
and sound on the great national policies," he was one of the consulting architects 
in their design. Those who believed that the stultifying conservatism of the 
Court could be corrected by appointing men of liberal economic and social 
predilections rightly rejoiced. If his performance on the Court disappointed 
them, the fault lay not in his past but in their premises. 
Personal Convictions and the Judge's Function 
Labor, which had felt the lash of the injunction and the helpless despair of 
sapped or strangled legislation, now had a new friend on the Court. As a young 
law professor, Frankfurter had been one of the front-rank fighters for the consti? 
tutionality of social legislation. He had helped perfect the "Brandeis brief" 
which sought to persuade the courts of the reasonableness of the statutes by 
presenting their factual, social and economic justification.2 He helped prepare 
the briefs and argued before the Supreme Court in the famous cases of Bunting 
v. Oregon 3 and Adkins v. Children's Hospital* His advocacy in these causes 
went beyond the Holmes aloofness that the legislatures should be allowed to 
make their own mistakes. He passionately believed in the rightness of the 
legislation.5 
fProfessor of Law, Yale Law School. 
1. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court 22 (1938), reprinted 
in Frankfurter, Law and Politics 61,67 (1939) (hereinafter cited as Law and Politics). 
Frankfurter is fond of pointing out that shortly after being seated Holmes disappointed 
Roosevelt's expectations by dissenting against the government in Northern Securities Co. 
v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1904). See 21 Dictionary of Am. Biography 417, 
422 (Supp. One, 1944), reprinted in Frankfurter, Of Law and Men 158,172 (1956) (here? 
inafter cited as Of Law amd Men). See also Frankfurter, Book Review, 44 Harv. L. 
Rev. 661, 662 (1931). 
2. MacLeish, Foreword to Law and Politics xviii-xix. 
3. 243 U.S. 426 (1917). The brief was prepared by Brandeis, Frankfurter and Gold- 
mark. After Brandeis was appointed, Frankfurter argued the case before the Court and 
won. See note 2 supra. 
4. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
5. See, e.g., Frankfurter, The Eight-Hour Day, letter to the editor, Boston Herald, 
Oct. 9, 1916, reprinted in Law and Politics 203. 
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Frankfurter was one of the most outspoken critics of the labor injunction. 
"[T]he use of labor injunctions has, predominantly, been a cumulative 
influence for discord in our national life. Mounting embitterment in masses 
of men and women has generated the growing conviction that the powers 
of the government are perverted by, and in aid of, the employers, and that 
the courts are the instruments of this partisan policy. . . . And the abuse 
of injunctions in labor cases can be discontinued only by the discontinuance 
of their use."e 
When the Arizona anti-injunction statute was declared unconstitutional in 
Truax v. Corrigan,7 he acidly remarked: "For all the regard that the Chief 
Justice of the United States pays to the facts of industrial life, he might as 
well have written this opinion as Chief Justice of the Fiji Islands."8 With 
Nathan Greene he published The Labor Injunction, a classic study of the 
procedural and substantive evils pervading this method of judicial control. 
The book served also as a scholarly brief and analysis for a federal anti-in junction 
statute which was enacted two years later as the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 
During the First World War, Frankfurter served as Secretary to the 
President's Commission on Mediation and Chairman of the War Labor Policies 
Board. Out of this experience grew a profound conviction that collective 
bargaining was a necessary correlative of political democracy. In 1920, he 
wrote: 
"Industrial unrest is bound to continue just so long as the present state 
of mind and feeling of workers is generated by growing disparity between 
their participation in politics and their exclusion from industrial direction. 
. . . Not until we act on a generous acceptance of the fact that what is 
at stake is a redistribution of power from the autocratic direction of em? 
ployers to the responsible participation of all who are involved in industry 
will we get out of the woods of feud and fury."9 
Ten years later, he affirmed his convictions, this time in economic rather than 
political terms: "Once we recognize that the right of combination by workers 
is in itself a corollary to the dogma of free competition, as a means of equalizing 
the factors that determine bargaining power, the consequences of making the 
power of unions effective will be seen in truer perspective."10 The declaration 
of policy in the Norris-LaGuardia Act was the flowering of his philosophy 
and also the seed which germinated in the Wagner Act. Less than four months 
before being named to the Court, he had written; "Economists and historians 
are now largely agreed that the resistance to a natural and responsible trade- 
unionism has been one of the most disturbing factors in our economy."11 
6. Frankfurter, Labor Injunctions Must Go, unsigned editorial, 32 New Republic 109, 
110 (1922), reprinted in Law and Politics 218, 220*21. 
7. 257 U.S. 312 (1921). 
8. Frankfurter, The Same Mr. Taft, unsigned editorial, 29 New Republic 191, 193 
(1922), reprinted in Law and Politics 41, 46. 
9. Frankfurter, Law and Order, 9 Yale Review (n.s.) 225, 229, 232 (1920), reprinted 
in Law and Politics 211, 213, 214. 
10. Frankfurter & Greene, The Labor Injunction 205 (1930). 
11. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court 37 (1938), reprinted 
in Law and Politics 61, 75. 
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If the deeply held social and economic beliefs of a Justice form the guide 
lines for his future decisions, organized labor could look forward to a brighter 
day. Here was an articulate advocate of protective legislation, an emancipator 
from the injunction and a tested champion of unionization and collective bar? 
gaining. This portrayal, however, described but half the man, for social and 
economic views were only part of his total framework of beliefs. His deeply 
held convictions of labor's rights were subsidiary to his broadly conceived 
principals on the proper functioning of our constitutional system.12 
On at least two occasions, Frankfurter had given notice that where these 
values conflicted, his interest in labor's rights was outranked by his central 
concern for a healthy and responsible political democracy. Writing in the 
New Republic, he shocked some of his single-minded friends with a vigorous 
defense of the Supreme Court's decision in the Child Labor Tax Case.13 
" 
'Hu- 
manity' is not the test of constitutionality. Recognition that a law enacted by 
Congress seeks to redress monstrous wrongs and to promote the highest good 
does not dispose of the Supreme Court's duty when the validity of such a law 
is challenged." The legislation was a "dishonest use of the taxing power" which 
would "violate the bond of the union." Even more shocking, he opposed the 
Child Labor Amendment, "because such concentration [in Washington] would 
be self-defeating in its execution and make for a corresponding paralysis of 
local responsibility."14 Much as he hated the economic evil, he prized federalism 
more. After the first Coronado Coal case,15 which held unions subject to suit 
as legal entities, he wrote in defense of the Court's decision, "complete immunity 
for all conduct is too dangerous an immunity to confer upon any group."16 His 
disagreement with the prevailing standards used by the courts in determining 
what union conduct was illegal did not alter his more fundamental belief in 
imposing legal responsibility on all groups in the community. 
Frankfurter did not shed his personal convictions as a worn-out cloak when 
he donned the judicial robes; they were too much a part of his view of the way 
the world should work. While they occasionally provide the dominant motives 
12. For an analysis of Frankfurter's complex of social and political views at the time 
he was appointed, see Hamilton, Preview of a lustice, 48 Yale L.J. 819 (1939). 
13. 259 U.S. 20 (1922). 
14. Frankfurter, Child Labor and the Court, 31 New Republic 248 (1922), re? 
printed in Law and Politics 206. To Frankfurter, the wiser solution was political 
education at the local level. "The deeper statesmanship may well be not to attempt re? 
moval from the remote center of this or that glaring evil, but to awaken the community to 
the need of its removal, for only by such vigorous civic education will an informed public 
opinion, essential to the enforcement of decent standards, be secured and sustained." Ibid. 
His suggestion on how to achieve local action was that "the' League of Women Voters 
in every state make it the order of the day to put a wise child labor law upon the statute 
books of every state." He envisioned that, "the states would furnish competition not in 
child labor, but in child welfare." Ibid. 
15. UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922). 
16. Frankfurter, The Coronado Case, 31 New Republic 328, 330 (1922). "The ques? 
tion is not whether the union should be responsible for a wrong, but whether certain acts 
complained of constitute a wrong." Ibid. 
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to his opinions, they create not a simple melody but competing themes. In 
United States v. Hutcheson, his first labor opinion, he used his own Norris- 
LaGuardia Act to loosen the shackles of the antitrust laws from labor.17 He 
contradicted his own declaration on the intended reach of the act and repudiated 
the line of reasoning to which he had subscribed less than one year earlier in 
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader.18 Collective bargaining required the combination 
of workmen. The bludgeoning antitrust laws were clumsy if not mischievously 
destructive devices that forced the courts to mark the difficult lines limiting 
the right of workers to combine for their mutual aid and protection. A better 
course was to sever labor from these laws and let Congress face frankly its 
responsibility of deciding at precisely what points the cost of competition is 
too great. Viewing the deeper thrust of the Norris-LaGuardia Act as removing 
from the courts the function of making labor law, he boldly used his child to 
do this man's work. 
However, giving "hospitable scope" to the act would not be carried to the 
point of threatening other more basic values. Unions must still live under the 
law. Thus, in United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, he protested 
that the majority had misread the Norris-LaGuardia Act and had given unions 
practical immunity from antitrust liability.19 The effect of the decision was to 
"turn back the clock of legal history a hundred years and disregard the practi- 
calities of collective action by powerful organizations."20 In United States v. 
UMW, his concern for protecting the authority of the courts to decide their 
own jurisdiction was so dominant that he risked reopening the door to the 
evils of the temporary injunction.21 Even though the act deprived the court 
of jurisdiction, the union, under pain of criminal contempt, had to follow the 
legal processes of appeal and obey the void order until it was reversed.22 Finally, 
17. 312 U.S. 219 (1941). 
18. 310 U.S. 469 (1940). In that case the argument was made that Congress intended 
to exclude activities of labor unions from the operation of the Sherman Act. The majority 
opinion, in which Frankfurter joined, disposed of this contention by saying: "The long 
time failure of Congress to alter the Act after it had been judicially construed, and the 
enactment by Congress of legislation which implicitly recognizes the judicial construction 
as effective, is persuasive of legislative recognition that the judicial construction is the 
correct one." Mat488. 
In Frankfurter & Greene, The Labor Injunction 215 (1930), Frankfurter had 
said: "But the immunity accorded is circumscribed: it is not immunity from legal as 
distinguished from equitable remedies,?hitherto unlawful conduct remains unlawful . . . ." 
And "all other remedies in federal courts and all remedies in state courts remain avail? 
able." Id. at 220. 
19. 330 U.S. 395,413 (1947). 
20. Id. at 420. Through this opinion runs the same theme as his comment on the first 
Coronado Coal case?unions should be governed by the same rule of liability as corpora? 
tions. Similarly, in United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), he joined in a decision 
holding union officers liable, just as coriporate officers, to deliver organization records in 
their possession. 
21. 330 U.S. 258 (1947). 
22. Frankfurter qualified this by saying: "To be sure, an obvious limitation upon a 
court cannot be circumvented by a frivolous inquiry into the existence of a power that has 
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not even the explicit words of the act, nor the evils of judicial interference 
in labor relations could bar the courts from enjoining unions when they abused 
their legal power to represent employees by discriminating against Negroes 
or other minority groups.28 
Frankfurter's personal convictions also colored, in perhaps more subtle 
tones, his opinions in cases involving protective labor legislation. His long 
battle against the rotting contagion of the sweatshop may be reflected in 
Gemsco, Inc. v. Waiting, where he supported the decision that, under the guise 
of preventing evasion of wage orders, the administration could flatly prohibit 
all homework in the embroidery industry even though this action destroyed a 
traditional method of production which accounted for forty per cent of the 
entire industry and in spite of congressional refusal to make such power ex? 
plicit.24 However, even this concern is not completely overriding.25 In 10 East 
40th Street Bldg. v. Callus, he limited the reach of the Wage-Hour Law by add- 
ing as a weighty factor the preservation of an area of regulation for the states.26 
The belief in the proper division of power within a system of federalism may 
supersede the belief in all-inclusive minimum wage laws.27 
Although these strong personal convictions which Frankfurter brought to 
the Court have left their mark, they help but little in understanding his labor 
unquestionably been withheld." Id. at 310. However, this qualification still leaves a risky 
opening for temporary injunctions, for the Court has engrafted a growing number of ex? 
ceptions on the act, and state courts have read broad exceptions into parallel state statutes. 
Many limitations are not so "obvious" as to make inquiry "frivolous." 
23. Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive1 Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949). The Norris- 
LaGuardia Act has not received favored treatment from Mr. Justice Frankfurter; rather, 
he has treated it as a disowned child. For sixteen years following Hutcheson, he consistent? 
ly voted to restrict its scope. In addition to the cases already mentioned, see Brotherhood 
of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957); Local 33, Bakery Sales 
Drivers v. Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437 (1948) ; Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Brotherhood 
of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945) ; Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945) (dissent? 
ing opinion) ; Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942). The only 
exception was Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W.R.R., 321 U.S. 50 (1944). 
Finally, in his last labor opinion, Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 
460 (1957), he filed a biting dissent, chiding the unions for making "an ally of an old 
enemy," because they sought to enforce the arbitration clause of a collective agreement by 
"resorting to the otherwise much excoriated labor injunction." Id. at 924. He indicated 
with the casualness of a footnote that the possibility existed that the act barred such equi? 
table relief. Id. at 927 n.3. 
24. 324 U.S. 244 (1945). 
25. Compare his refusal to uphold the exemptions for agricultural workers as defined 
by the Administrator. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc, 322 U.S. 607 (1944). 
26. 325 U.S. 578 (1945). 
27. Frankfurter voted with the majority in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 
U.S. 490 (1945), which restrictively interpreted the child labor provisions of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act. This vote may have reflected a residue of his earlier stated beliefs 
that child labor should be attacked at the local rather than national level. His article on 
the Child Labor Tax Case, see note 14 supra and accompanying text, is clearly echoed in 
his dissent in United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 37 (1953), where he protested that the 
federal gambling tax was an encroachment on reserved state power. 
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decisions. These were his views as a citizen advocating social and political 
measures according to his personal preferences. As a Justice, he no longer 
speaks as a citizen but as an instrument of the law which expresses a con- 
sensus beyond the views of any single citizen. Judicial robes did not change 
the man but they did change his function, and Mr. Justice Frankfurter is acutely 
aware of his changed function.28 He is articulately self-conscious that a bind? 
ing set of values appropriate to that special responsibility has been imposed 
upon him. "[A] judge worth his salt is in the grip of his function."29 The 
first place in his hierarchy of values, therefore, is granted to those which define 
the proper role of the Court within our political and social structure.30 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinions in labor cases constitute no identifiable 
unit. Such a classification is to him meaningless if not improper, for he does 
not conceive any unique role for the Court in labor law. His opinions do reflect 
notions on the structure and purpose of collective bargaining, but these views 
seldom decide concrete cases. Largely governed by overriding considerations 
which cut across all fields, his decisions in labor cases are but special manifesta- 
tions of pervading principles. 
To examine the decisions of Mr. Justice Frankfurter?or any other 
judge worthy of the robe?merely in the light of his political or eco? 
nomic views is to stand a candle in the corner. To attempt to label 
him prolabor or antilabor is to blow the candle out. The significant study 
28. " 'Does a man become any different when he puts on a gown ?' I say, if he is any 
good, he does." Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 Va. L. Rev. 883, 901 
(1953), reprinted in Of Law and Men 101,133. "If judges want to be preachers, they should 
dedicate themselves to the pulpit; if judges want to be1 primary shapers of policy, the legis? 
lature is their place. Self-willed judges are the least defensible offenders against govern? 
ment under law." Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 
217, 238 (1955), reprinted in Of Law and Men 3, 29. In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 
U.S. 315 (1943), he dissented from a decision which narrowed the diversity jurisdiction of 
the federal courts: "I speak as one who has long favored the entire abolition of diversity 
jurisdiction. . . . But I must decide this case as a judge and not as a legislative reformer." 
Id. at 337, Although Frankfurter feels bound to vote as a judge, he still feels free to preach 
in his opinions. See, e.g., his broadside attack on the whole institution of diversity juris? 
diction as a misconceived policy in his concurring opinion in Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. 
v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 53-60 (1954). 
29. Frankfurter, Some Observations on the Nature of the Judicial Process of Supreme 
Court Litigation, 98 Proceedings, American Philosophical Society 233, 238 (1954), 
reprinted in Of Law and Men 31, 41. He made even more explicit the subservience of the 
judge to his conception of his function. "To assume that a lawyer who becomes a judge 
takes on the bench merely his views on social or economic questions leaves out of account 
his rooted notions regarding the scope and limits of a judge's authority. The outlook of 
a lawyer fit to be a Justice regarding the role of a judge cuts across all his personal pref? 
erences for this or that social arrangement." Ibid. 
30. Shortly before1 being nominated to the Court, Frankfurter had written: "The con? 
ception which a judge has of his own function, and the fastidiousness with which he follows 
it, will in large measure determine the most delicate controversies before him." Frank? 
furter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court 25 (1938), reprinted in Law 
and Politics 61, 69. 
This content downloaded  on Tue, 12 Mar 2013 00:05:35 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
272 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol.67-.266 
is first, to seek diligently to discover his conception of his role as a member 
of the Court, and second, to examine critically whether that conception is ade? 
quate to our needs. While confining such a study to labor decisions creates 
risks of distortion, the narrower focus may also make the lines sharper. 
The Duty Not To Decide 
No member of the Court invokes more vigorously than Mr. Justice Frank? 
furter the sheaf of rules which enables it to avoid passing on constitutional 
issues. Controversial labor cases have suffered from such spurning. For ex? 
ample, in Westinghouse, he explicitly skirted the constitutionality of section 
301 of the Taft-Hartley Act by seizing upon a restrictive interpretation which 
he tacitly recognized had little foundation in logic, legislative history or the 
practicalities of collective bargaining.31 In United States v. UAW, the union 
was indicted for using union dues to sponsor television broadcasts urging 
the election of certain candidates to Congress.32 The statute could not be dis- 
torted to exclude this conduct, but Frankfurter still refused to "enter upon 
the delicate process of constitutional adjudication'' when it was not "absolutely 
necessary to a decision."33 The case could be remanded, and the constitutional 
issues could await trial. 
Rigid adherence to these rules of avoidance does not represent for Frankfurter 
an evasion of responsibility; for him, a duty exists not to decide constitutional 
issues unless they are inescapable. The duty measures the role which he be? 
lieves the Court can and should play within a democratic structure. Determina? 
tion of constitutionality is delicate, for the issues are often essentially political 
and come to the Court thinly disguised in legal garb. The cloistered oligarchy 
which is not answerable to the electorate is asked to judge these issues of policy. 
Such power should be sparingly used lest it be swept away by outraged popular 
opinion.34 
More central to Frankfurter's conception of the Court is his profound distrust 
of its competence to judge these issues. The training and experience of the 
Justices, the limitations which litigation places on full exploration of all relevant 
facts and the episodic and fortuitous presentation of narrow facets in isolated 
cases disable the Court from making a creative contribution to solution of the 
31. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
348 U.S. 437 (1955). The Court here narrowly construed the federal statute to avoid the 
constitutional issue. However, the Court may also read into the statute special standards 
giving affirmative protection to quasi-constitutional rights because otherwise "constitutional 
questions arise." Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944). 
32. 352 U.S. 567 (1957). 
33. Id. at 590. 
34. Frankfurter has been deeply impressed by the chain of events following Dred Scott 
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), particularly by the jeopardy in which the de? 
cision placed the Court. The constitutional issue could there have been avoided by dealing 
only with the precise facts of the case. See United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 590 
(1957). 
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complex social problems involved. Postponement may gain the time necessary 
for solution through more appropriate and competent channels. The costs of 
uncertainty are weighed against the "self-inflicted wounds" suffered by the 
Court when it has needlessly pronounced on constitutional issues.35 "The 
impressive lesson of history confirms the wisdom of the . . . self-imposed 
inhibition . . . ."36 
Labor cases bear witness to this wisdom. Frankfurter classifies Adkins v. 
Children's Hospital among the Court's self-inflicted wounds.37 Similarly, in 
United States v. Petrillo,38 the Court floundered into declaring the Lea Act 
constitutional on a motion to dismiss the indictment, only to have the district 
court find after trial that Petrillo had not violated the act.39 The mischievous 
remand of Government and Civic Employees, CIO v. Windsor, on the other 
hand, may serve to give the Alabama legislature time to recognize that union? 
ization of government employees can serve constructive purposes.40 
To find that the Court's avoidance of constitutional issues has sometimes 
been wise does not, however, entirely dispose of the matter. Useful rules may 
be transformed into self-justify ing absolutes.41 The only safeguard against 
petrifaction is a constant attention to the purposes served by the particular 
rule. Frankfurter never faces the unsettling question whether the reasons for 
judicial inhibition apply with equal force to all situations. Two cases suggest 
the problem. In United States v. CIO, the Court confronted one of the most 
controversial provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act less than one year after its 
adoption.42 Whether unions should be free to make political contributions or 
35. The1 phrase is found in Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States 
50 (1928). 
36. United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 590 (1957). This is Frankfurter's most 
deeply rooted notion as to the proper functioning of the Court. See, e.g., Frankfurter, 
The Supreme Court of the United States, 14 Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences 474, 
475-77 (1934), reprinted in Law and Politics 21, 23-28. 
37. See Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 
217, 235 (1955), reprinted in Of Law and Men 3, 25. 
38. 332 U.S. 1 (1947). 
39. 75 F. Supp. 176 (N.D. 111. 1948). 
40. 77 Sup. Ct. 838 (1957). Where constitutionality of a state statute is involved, 
the Court insists that the statute first be authoritatively interpreted in the state courts in 
reference to a concrete fact situation. AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946); Alabama 
State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945). In Windsor, the statute had 
been interpreted by the state court, but the Court remanded the case because the state court 
had not been "asked to interpret the statute in light of the constitutional objections . . . ." If 
these arguments had been presented to the state court "it might have construed the statute 
in a different manner." 77 Sup. Ct. at 839. The plaintiffs must first seek a reinterpretation. 
41. This is particularly true where the rules relied upon are merely technical devices 
to achieve the result and do not reflect the reason for their invocation. Some, but not all, 
of the rules of avoidance are of this technical nature or are at times technically applied. 
42. 335 U.S. 106 (1948). In his concurring opinion, Frankfurter spells out many of the 
rules which the Court uses in avoiding constitutional issues. He .preferred to dispose of 
the case, not by narrowly construing the statute, but by holding that the constitutional issue 
was not properly presented because the government had not argued the most effective 
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use union funds for political activity was clearly a problem in the domain of 
public debate. The Court, in avoiding the constitutional issues, in fact projected 
a compromise, giving unions some freedom which they feared had been elimi? 
nated by the statute. Delay served the constructive purpose of allowing time 
for the parties to make their own accommodation. Unions could experiment 
with a program of public discussion of general issues, energetic campaigning 
among members and voluntary contributions for candidates. This program 
might fulfill their needs and capacities and also be tolerable to those who looked 
askance at union political action. Furthermore, the Court might gain time to 
see the broad implications of the problem, to learn of variations in union activity 
and to project new compromises. The solution nearly succeeded, and the ten 
intervening years have east new light on the complex problem. After the Petrillo 
embarrassment, the Court's avoidance of this constitutional issue in United 
States v. UAW until after trial was understandable.43 Even though no dispute 
exists about the facts on which an indictment is based, trial of the case may 
produce a broad picture of the whole pattern of union practices and other relevant 
facts that will be extremely helpful to the Court in making its ultimate de? 
termination. 
In contrast stands the Westinghouse case. No substantial political issue was 
posed here, for few seriously contended in 1954 that employers or unions 
should not be legally responsible under collective agreements. The constitutional 
problem was the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The question was legal, not 
political?and the Court was the most competent of all agencies of government 
to solve it. The Court refused to exercise its competence, not by creating a 
bearable compromise but by cleaving the collective contract in two. It did not 
encourage accommodation but compelled confusion.44 The day of reckoning 
could only be postponed, and in the meantime a disruptive dichotomy was in- 
jected into the law of collective agreements. Even after the constitutional 
grounds for supporting the statute, nor had the defendants urged a construction of the 
statute that would have secured their rights without declaring it unconstitutional. Id. at 
124-29. 
43. In both United States v. CIO and United States v. UAW, Frankfurter pointedly 
cited the Petrillo case and the subsequent dismissal of the indictment. He seemed resolved 
not to make the same mistake' again. Subsequent events have proved the wisdom of his 
position. At trial, UAW's evidence described a broad program of education in public 
affairs directed largely toward its members. The presentation of candidates prior to elec? 
tion was only incidental to the year-round program. At the end of the trial, the jury 
acquitted the union. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1957, p. 1, col. 4. 
44. Frankfurter interpreted ? 301 as not authorizing a union to enforce in the federal 
courts the "employer's failure to comply with terms of a collective agreement relating to 
compensation, terms .peculiar in the individual benefit which is their subject matter and 
which, when violated, give" a cause of action to the individual employee." 348 U.S. at 460. 
The confusion which this created is suggested by UEW v. General Elec. Co., 231 F.2d 259 
(D.C. Cir. 1956) ; United Steel Workers v. Galland-Henning Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 323 (7th 
Cir. 1957) ; ILGWU v. Jay-Ann Co., 228 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Burlesque Artists 
Ass'n v. I. Hirst Enterprises, 134 F. Supp. 203 (E.D. Pa. 1955). 
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issue is settled, this scar may remain,45 All the Court has gained by delay 
is guidance from some of their more rational brethren on the circuit courts.46 
Black v. Cutter Laboratories suggests another factor which may question 
rigid application of the rules of avoidance.47 The California supreme court re? 
fused to enforce the award of an arbitrator ordering reinstatement of a worker 
who was a communist; to enforce her contract rights, the court felt, would 
violate public policy. The Supreme Court ignored the clear import of the 
opinion, carefully read excerpts out of context, discovered separate state grounds 
for the decision and held that it would therefore not decide the constitutional 
issue. Encroachments on personal freedoms spread spores for further intoler- 
ance. Delay may only make the Court's task more difficult; for its silence might 
encourage further encroachments and thereby create a more hostile climate 
for its ultimate decision. True the California supreme court may retreat from 
its position, but can the Supreme Court of the United States afford not to 
speak in the face of such a position?48 
Avoidance of constitutional issues is a cautionary guide drawn from the 
lessons of history, but it imposes a price. The balance of gains and losses is 
not identical in all cases but shifts radically depending on the kind of issue 
involved and the method used to avoid it. Frankfurter would lump all cases 
together, strike a general average from the course of history and impose on 
45. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), left open the ques? 
tion whether the cleavage continues. Its ultimate resolution may depend on whether Frank? 
furter, once the constitutional issue is settled, will interpret ? 301 differently; he indicated 
in Westinghouse that he might be disposed to take this course, if no constitutional ques? 
tions were involved. 
46. See, e.g., the thorough analysis of the problems by Judge Magruder in Local 205, 
United Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85 (lst Cir. 1956) ; Local 25, Team? 
sters Union, AFL v. W. L. Mead, Inc, 230 F.2d 576 (lst Cir. 1956). The Court also 
obtained helpful analyses in law review articles. See Mendelsohn, Enforceability of Arbi? 
tration Agreements Under Taft-Hartley Section 301, 66 Yale LJ. 167 (1956); Wollett 
& Wellington, Federalism and Breach of the Labor Agreement, 7 Stan. L. Rev. 445 
(1956). 
47. 351 U.S. 292 (1956). 
48. Compare United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953), where Frankfurter care? 
fuliy avoided making any statements about what, if any, constitutional restrictions limited 
the power of congressional investigating committees by construing the committee's em- 
powering resolution with mutilating narrowness. Considerations of the first magnitude 
suggested avoidance, for this was a uniquely political problem directly subject to political 
checks. However, countervailing demands were also present. The right of organizations 
to distribute .political tracts and to influence public opinion was involved, and this right was 
subject to continued jeopardy by other more! aggressive committees. Postponement until 
1957 of any pronouncement on this problem was not without serious costs, not all of which 
may yet be clear. 
Delay may bring the problem before a different court and produce a different result. 
Members of the Court who foresee an undesirable result if the constitutional issue is raised 
may seek postponement to a later and possibly more favorable time. This is to convert the 
rules of avoidance into manipulative devices for the purpose of effecting personal prefer? 
ences by subterfuge. 
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the Court unbending rules. The Court is not left free to weigh the gains and 
losses case by case but is bound by mechanical rules of judicial self-restraint. 
Deference to Legislative Judgment 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's central concept that the Court has limited com? 
petence in the political and social sphere makes its heaviest impact when acts 
of the legislature are challenged. The Court must have, "above all, the hu- 
mility not to set up its own judgment against the conscientious efforts of 
those whose primary duty it is to govern."49 
His deference to the legislative branch is well known, but that it grew 
directly from his nrst-hand experience in preparing and arguing labor cases 
before the Court is not so well known. In 1912, before he became an under- 
study to Brandeis, he recognized that the Court in determining the constitu? 
tionality of minimum wage or maximum hour laws was making a social not 
a legal judgment. However, he argued not for judicial abdication but for 
judicial enlightenment. He saw the Brandeis brief as a device enabling the 
Court to give "due regard to the facts which induced the legislation."50 Such 
a judicial approach would leave "still unimpaired the benefits of the reviewing 
power of the judiciary in our governmental system, for the reflex action of the 
existence of this power on the part of the courts to set aside legislation re? 
strains unwise legislative action and induces the scientific attitude of basing 
legislation only upon adequately ascertained facts."51 
When, however, the Taft Court "veered toward a narrow conception of 
the Constitution,"52 he began to re-examine his premises. In 1921, the Court 
declared the Arizona anti-injunction act invalid as a taking of property and 
denial of equal protection of the laws,53 This decision, declared Frankfurter, 
is "fraught with more evil than any which it has rendered in a generation. It 
challenges the whole scope of judicial review under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments."54 In 1923, Frankfurter argued and lost Adkins v. Children's 
Hospital, a decision which blotted out fifteen years of judicial enlightenment.55 
His disillusionment destroyed any confidence in "the benefits of the reviewing 
49. Frankfurter, Social Issues Before the Supreme Court, 22 Yale Review (n.s.) 
476, 486 (1933), reprinted in Law and Politics 48, 52-53. 
50. Frankfurter, The Zeitgeist and the Judiciary, 29 Survey 542, 543 (1933), reprinted 
in Law and Politics 3, 4. 
51. Id. at 544, Law and Politics at 9. This was written after Brandeis's signal vic- 
tory in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), and during a period of relative judicial 
tolerance. Subsequent victories in Stettler v. O'Hara, 243 U.S. 629 (1917), and Bunting 
v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917), gave continued confidence that the Court could provide 
a healthy check on unwise legislative action without hampering needed social reforms. 
52. Frankfurter, The Supreme Court of the United States, 14 Encyclopaedia of the 
Social Sciences 474, 477 (1934), reprinted in Law and Politics 21, 27. 
53. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921). 
54. Frankfurter, The Same Mr. Taft, unsigned editorial, 29 New Republic 191, 192 
(1922), reprinted in Law and Politics 41, 44. 
55. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
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power . . . to set aside . . . unwise legislative action."56 In 1924, he wrote, "no 
nine men are wise enough and good enough to be entrusted with the power which 
the unlimited provisions of the due process clauses confer. . . . The due process 
clauses ought to go."57 
This deep distrust of the Court's competence was repeatedly reinforced by 
later labor cases. In 1938, looking back, he pointed to the social evils suffered 
because the Constitution had been "used as an obstruction to the healthy de? 
velopment of trade-unionism" by voiding legislation protecting the right of 
association. "One can only surmise," he said, "what would have been the 
gain to social peace and economic security had the dissenting views expressed 
more than twenty years ago by Mr. Justice Holmes been the Court's 
views . . . ,"58 
Ironically, all of these battles had been won by the time he reached the 
Court. As Felix Cohen observed, "one may wonder what there is left for 
Mr. Frankfurter to contribute to a court and a body of law that have already 
accepted his chief teaching."59 Even more ironically, distrust of the Court's 
competence, Frankfurter's central concept born out of antilabor decisions, re? 
ceived one of its most articulate statements in an opinion upholding a state 
law prohibiting all forms of union security agreements.60 The concept caused 
him to be termed a liberal at the time of his appointment; his extension of it 
on the Court has exposed him to criticism as a conservative. 
The reasoning with which Frankfurter has girded his distrust of judicial 
power and deference to legislative judgment is reflected in the arguments 
which he marshals in AFL v. American Sash & Door Co.61 They carry 
logically not only to the conclusion that the due process clause must go, 
but reach far beyond, almost to the brink of repudiating all judicial review of 
legislative action.62 Although he there overstates his position, he clearly re? 
veals how deep-running this current is in his judicial philosophy.63 
56. Frankfurter, The Zeitgeist and the ludiciary, 29 Survey 542, 544 (1933), reprinted 
in Law and Politics 3, 9. 
57. Frankfurter, The Red Terror of Judicial Reform, unsigned editorial, 40 New Re? 
public 110, 113 (1924), reprinted in Law and Politics 10, 16. 
58. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court 38 (1938), re? 
printed in Law and Politics 61, 76. 
59. Cohen, Book Review of Law and Politics, 101 New Republic 145 (1939). State 
and federal anti-injunction legislation had been upheld. Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 
U.S. 468 (1937) ; Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938). Minimum wage 
legislation had been sustained. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
And statutory protection of unionization including proscription of yellow dog contracts had 
been validated. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Frankfurter 
shared only in upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act. United States v. Darby, 312 
U.S. 100 (1941). 
60. AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949). 
61. Ibid. 
62. Frankfurter does not expressly repudiate substantive due process, but he emphasizes 
(1) "the function of legislating is for legislatures who have also taken oaths to support 
the Constitution"; (2) "the powers exercised by this Court are inherently oligarchic"; 
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The legislature shall have its way?unless it tramples on some value which 
he believes has deep roots or recognition in our history and is fundamental to 
our way of life. Thus, in Goesaert v. Cleary,M he sustained a whimiscally con- 
trived Michigan statute restricting the employment of barmaids, even though 
the legislation had no factually supported basis other than an "unchivalrous 
desire of male bartenders . . . to monopolize the calling." Discrimina? 
tion on the basis of sex was not invidious if the state asserted "an entertain- 
able belief" that the measure met a "moral and social problem."65 On the 
other hand, the Taft-Hartley noncommunist affidavit went too far. Although 
Congress could bar statutory protection to unions whose officers were mem? 
bers of the Communist Party, the statute required an oath on beliefs so broadly 
worded as to "probe into opinions," an interrogation which "invades the inner 
life of men." Such violation of the "citadel of his person" is unconstitutional 
because it "involves surrender of freedoms which exceeds what may fairly be 
exacted."66 No attempt is made in either case to articulate a rational standard 
or to demonstrate factually that the statute violated our deeply rooted tra- 
(3) "the judiciary is prone to misconceive the public good . . . and such misconceptions 
are not subject to legitimate displacement... except at too slow a paee"; (4) if a democracy 
"is alert?and without alertness by the people there can be no enduring democracy?unwise 
or unfair legislation can readily be removed from the statute books." He then grudgingly 
admits that judicial review is "now too much a part of our constitutional system to be 
brought into question." 
In defining the standard to be applied he says: "Courts can fulfill their responsibility 
in a democratic society only to the extent they succeed in shaping their judgments by 
rational standards, and rational standards are both impersonal and communicable. Matters 
of policy, however, are by definition matters which demand the resolution of conflicts of 
value, and the elements of conflicting values are largely imponderable. Assessment of 
their competing worth involves differences of feeling; it is also an exercise in prophecy." 
Id. at 555-57. 
63. A strong clue to Frankfurter's concept of the Court's function is given when he 
suggests that the reasoning of Marbury v. Madison "is not impeccable and its conclusion, 
however wise, not inevitable." Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 
Harv. L. Rev. 217, 219 (1955), reprinted in Of Law and Men 3, 5. In his opinions, 
one catches a note of awkwardness and embarrassment that the Court has been saddled 
with this inappropriate function. See, e.g., his concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957). 
64. 335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
65. Id. at 466-67. He did not object to a Louisiana statute which effectively barred 
anyone from becoming a harbor pilot except sons of present pilots. This legally enforced 
nepotism was justified by the "context of the historical evolution of the laws and institu? 
tion of pilotage." Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 557 (1947). 
In light of his strong hostility to other discriminatory practices, Frankfurter's vote here 
is explainable only on the extreme uniqueness of pilotage work and traditions. 
66. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 419-22 (1950) (con? 
curring opinion). The underlying value involved here is one Frankfurter prizes most 
highly?the right of privacy. The breadth and weight he gives to this value is evidenced 
in his opinions in United States v. Witkovitch, 353 U.S. 194 (1957) ; On Lee v. United 
States, 343 U.S. 747, 758 (1952) (dissenting opinion) ; Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 
U.S. 1, 16 (1941) (dissenting opinion). He rebels against the ever-encroaching hucksters 
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ditions. When the opinion is stripped of verbiage, he thinks it so because he 
thinks it so. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter does not attempt to distinguish between these cases on 
the ground that the Court has a special function in protecting against legislative 
encroachments on personal freedoms. On the contrary, he has explicitly rejected 
such a distinction. There are no preferred freedoms. "How best to reconcile 
competing interests is the business of legislatures . . . to be respected 
unless outside the pale of fair judgment."67 This rejection of the preferred 
freedoms doctrine may have resulted from a gradual process during his first 
ten years on the Court. In 1938, he wrote: 
"Naturally, therefore, Mr. Justice Holmes attributed very different sig? 
nificance to those liberties of the individual which history has attested 
as the indispensable of a free society from that which he attached to liber? 
ties which derived merely from shifting economic arrangements. . . . 
Because these civil liberties were explicitly safeguarded in the Constitu? 
tion, or conceived to be basic to any notion of the liberty guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment, Mr. Justice Holmes was far more ready to 
find legislative invasion in this field than in the area of debatable economic 
reform."68 
His Barnette dissent, in 1943, stated in most forceful terms the Court's 
oligarchic character and its narrow function in striking down acts of the 
legislature which was answerable to majority will. Yet he betrayed a willing? 
ness to give special protection within the limited scope of free speech. 
"All channels of affirmative free expression are open to both children 
and parents. Had we before us any act of the state putting the slightest 
curbs upon such free expression, I should not lag behind any member 
of this Court in striking down such an invasion of the right to freedom 
of thought and freedom of speech protected by the Constitution."69 
As late as 1949, in sustaining "right-to-work" laws, he could say: "For 
these are not matters, like censorship of the press or separation of Church 
and State, on which history, through the Constitution, speaks so decisively 
and electronic invasions which penetrate the walls of silence and solitude. See PUC v. 
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466 (1952) (explanation for not voting) ; Radio Corp. v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 412, 421 (1951) (in dubitante opinion). 
67. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 539-40 (1951). 
68. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court 51 (1938). In the 
last piece he wrote before being nominated to the Court, Frankfurter answered friendly 
critics of Cardozo who suggested that he "viewed encroachments upon civil liberties with 
less deference to the legislative judgment than that which he accorded economic measures." 
Frankfurter said that the same was said about Holmes and that the answer applied also 
to Cardozo. He then requoted in full his interpretation of Holmes's philosophy. Frank? 
furter, Mr. Justice Cardozo and Public Law, 48 Yale L.J. 458, 479-80 n.47 (1939), 39 
Colum. L. Rev. 88, 109-10 n.47 (1939), 52 Harv. L. Rev. 440, 461-62 n.47 (1939), re? 
printed in Law and Politics 88, 97-98 n.2. 
69. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 664 (1943) (dissent? 
ing opinion). 
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as to forbid legislative experimentation."70 Not until the Dennis opinion did 
he finally reject free speech as subject to special judicial protection.71 
This development makes more understandable his opinions in the picketing 
cases. In 1940, he joined in the sweeping pronouncements of Thornhill v. 
Alabama.12 The following year, in AFL v. Swing, he held that a state could 
not ban organizational picketing to protect the economic interests of an em? 
ployer on the ground that no dispute existed between the employer and his 
employees.73 Traces of the special protection theory for free speech could be 
seen: "[A]s we have frequently indicated, that right is to be guarded with a 
jealous eye_"74 On the same day, in Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadow? 
moor Dairies, Inc, he spoke of the "generous scope which must be given to free 
speech," and asserted: "Freedom of speech and freedom of press cannot be 
too often invoked as basic to our scheme of society."75 Ritter revealed some 
weakening, but the case involved only the power of the state "to confine the 
sphere of communication" in a geographical sense.76 
By 1950, the break was nearly complete.77 In Hanke, there was no talk 
of "generous scope" or "guarding with a jealous eye";78 the language was 
indistinguishable from AFL v. American Sash & Door. The union had 
picketed self-employed car dealers because they refused to follow the union's 
70. AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 550 (1949) (concurring opinion). 
71. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 526-27 (1951) (dissenting opinion). His 
concurring opinion in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949), made a broadside attack 
on use by the Court of formulae such as "preferred freedom" or "presumptive invalidity." 
This opinion might be considered a final rejection of any notion that the Court's function 
is any different where free speech has been curtailed. However, it is evident that Frank? 
furter saw regulation of sound trucks as a clash between the right of a noisy group to in? 
vade the privacy of unwilling listeners and the right of society to "serenity and reflection" 
without which "freedom of thought becomes a mocking phrase." Id. at 97. In this clash 
between two aspects of freedom of thought, the legislature could choose?and here its 
choice was probably the same as Frankfurter's. In Dennis, the clash of interests was not 
the same, the content of the speech was condemned, and Frankfurter expresses his mis- 
giving as to the wisdom of the legislation. See 341 U.S. at 553-56. 
72. 310 U.S. 88 (1940). In his earlier writings, Frankfurter had suggested that labor 
injunctions invaded freedom of speech, press and assembly. It is not clear from the context 
what particular union activities he had in mind when he used this language, but picketing 
would seem included. See Frankfurter, The Labor Injunction, 8 Encyclofaedia of the 
Social Sciences 653 (1932), reprinted in Law and Politics 222; Frankfurter, Labor In? 
junctions Must Go, 32 New Republic 109 (1922), reprinted in Law and Politics 218. 
73. 312 U.S. 321. (1941). 
74. Id. at 325. For this proposition, he cited Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) ; 
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) ; and the famous footnote in United States v. 
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). These were treated as the source of 
the "preferred freedom" notion in his Kovacs and Dennis opinions. 
75. 312 U.S. 287, 299 (1941). 
76. Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 727 (1942). 
77. For Frankfurter, the decisive reconsideration of the free speech picketing problem 
came in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949). See International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc, 354 U.S. 284, 291 (1957). 
78. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950). 
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rules on closing hours. The state could conclude, ruled Frankfurter, that it 
was more important to protect self-employers than to allow communication 
of the facts of the dispute through picketing. The Court would not deny the 
state the power to strike this balance. "The clash of fact and opinion should 
be resolved by the democratic process and not by the judicial sword."79 
This line of analysis reveals the futility of any attempt to reconcile his 
opinions on picketing; his premises have shifted. The tour de force in 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc. traces a jagged line of 
precedent based on the facts of each case but is less an explanation than a retro- 
spective rationalization.80 More significantly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's pres? 
ent position renders fruitless discussion whether picketing is free speech, for 
the Court's function is the same regardless of what social values clash. Picket? 
ing is a form of communication, but its social value is of no different order 
than that which a state may find in protecting small business. The exact pro? 
portions of speech, economic pressure, or coercion need not be analyzed or 
measured by the Court. The test is still the broad, indefinable one of due 
process applicable to all forms of regulation, speech or otherwise.81 Further? 
more, to Frankfurter the right to picket is clearly not one of our deeply rooted 
traditions; he will defer to legislative judgment as to when it should be 
curbed.82 
What emerges as Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dominant conception of the 
Court's role in a democracy is both pervasive and rigid. The Court's function 
in reviewing legislative acts is the same regardless of time or place or subject 
matter. If the premise be accepted that ours is and ought to be a government 
of unfettered majority rule, rigid judicial abstinence is required. This premise, 
however, is contrary to history and unproven by experience. Our constitu? 
tional system assumes, and Frankfurter does not deny, that the judiciary must 
maintain some constitutional f etters on the legislature. In bold terms, we do 
not have unlimited trust in majorities. The nondemocratic organ of govern? 
ment must provide safeguards from gross legislative excesses. The function 
79. Id. at 478. In Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950), Frankfurter had 
held that whether the state policy was expressed by the judiciary or legislative branch was 
immaterial. Distribution of powers of government was for the state to decide. He does 
not face openly the question whether a policy so determined had any roots in the democratic 
process so as to justify deference by the Supreme1 Court. The deference is here based on 
values rooted in federalism rather than majority will. 
80. 354 U.S. 284, 287-93 (1957). One may hazard a guess that if he were writing 
on a clean slate, Swing would now come out differently. 
81. If Frankfurter's opinions are conf used in this field, he has more justification than 
those who, like Douglas, assert that "picketing has aspects which make it more than speech" 
without providing any guide or analysis as to what the "more" may be or the different 
variations in which the "it" may occur. 
82. He has recently characterized picketing as "the weapon of strikes" and intermixed 
without distinction the constitutional position of strikes and picketing. Frankfurter, John 
Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 217, 231 (1955), reprinted in Of 
Law and Men 3, 21. 
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of the Court varies according to the danger of irresponsible majority rule, 
and this danger varies in infinite patterns. The dangers to a democracy posed 
by invasion of freedom of speech and invasion of contract are not of the same 
order. Denial of the right to vote and denial of the right to practice a particu? 
lar profession do not create equal threats to the democratic process. Classifi? 
cations based on race may be more suspect than classifications based on sex, 
if for no other reason than that of relative political weakness. Religious mi? 
norities may be more commonly victimized by intolerant majorities than are 
economic minorities.88 
These varied needs tend to be obscured by Frankfurter's rigid concept 
which asserts that the Court's function is the same in all cases. If judicial 
review is to fulfill its purpose, the Court must assess at each point the dangers 
that democratic processes will go astray and then adjust its level of review to 
meet that danger. Furthermore, the critical danger points are not permanently 
fixed, but may shift from one period of history to another. There may be no 
enduring standards for the Court which are equally valid for all time. Upon 
each judge may be east the awesome responsibility of measuring correctly 
the necessities of his time. 
Givtng Meaning to Legislative Words 
Most labor cases coming before the Court involve statutory not constitu? 
tional questions. In these cases, the basic premise?that the primary law- 
making agency in a democracy is the legislature?provides little more than 
an inner sense of obligation or a frame of reference. It may prevent judicial 
willfulness in rewriting statutes, but it will not guide the Court to the 
elusive legislative will. 
Believing that he should neither legislate nor frustrate legislation, Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter is torn by conflicting compulsions. On the one hand, his 
logic constrains him not to go beyond the words of the statute. "[T]he function 
in construing a statute is to ascertain the meaning of words used by the legis? 
lature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power which our democracy has lodged 
in its elected legislature."84 The Court is but a "translator of another's com? 
mand."85 It is neither to add to nor subtract from the explicit words any 
more "than is called for by the shorthand nature of language."86 This 
mechanistic description of the judge's role is reinforced by two motivations 
that permeate much of his thinking. First, the judge's role should be limited, 
83. This does not imply neat categories that can be labelled "preferred" or to which 
"presumptions" can be mechanically attached. It suggests only that thef Court in exercising 
its veto power keep in mind the justification for that power. The approach may be confin- 
ing, but within the confines exists a constructive responsibility. The judge1 would have 
no wider freedom in writing his private notions into fundamental law than under Frank? 
furter's standardless standards. 
84. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes 13 (1947). 
85. Id. at 14. 
86. Id. at 16. 
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to protect against willful judges who lack humility and self-restraint.87 Second, 
the Courts should not act as a cleanup crew for sloppy legislators but should 
increase the pressure on them to discharge their responsibilities.88 These 
formulations and considerations tend to shrink the Court's vision to the words 
of the statute itself.89 The wider the view to "context" or "purpose" or 
"intent," the more evidence the judicial libertine can find to justify his willed 
result. To find meaning outside the words relieves Congress of pressure to 
state its will as precisely as possible. 
On the other hand, Frankfurter's practical sense reminds him that such 
narrowness frustrates congressional purpose; for the legislative process is 
imperfect, and statutory language is inevitably deficient.90 This is particularly 
true of labor legislation, which is characteristically skeletal and experimental.91 
Often, Congress has unwittingly or deliberately failed to decide the more com? 
plicated or more contentious problems. The Court cannot interpret, it must 
construct; its function is not to translate but create. Thus, Frankfurter speaks 
of the judge as "selected by society to give meaning to what the legislature 
has done . . . ,"92 
The labor cases reveal Frankfurter not as a translator but as a creator who 
does not confine himself either to the words of the statute or the minds of 
the legislators. Some samples give more flavor than any generalizations. In 
87. Thus, Frankfurter objected to Hand's description of statutory interpretation as 
"proliferation of purpose" because "it might justify interpretations by judicial libertines, 
not merely judicial libertarians." Id. at 8. 
88. "In a democracy the legislative1 impulse and its expression should come from those 
popularly chosen to legislate and equipped to devise policy, as courts are not. The pres? 
sure on legislatures to discharge their responsibility with care1, understanding and imagi- 
nation should be stiffened, not relaxed. Above all, they must not be encouraged in irrespon- 
sible or undisciplined use1 of language." Id. at 29. 
89. For two such narrowly written opinions see Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, 
Inc, 322 U.S. 607 (1944), and Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 
U.S. 511 (1955). However, in spite of his strong language when speaking generally, 
Frankfurter seldom confines himself to the1 bare words of the statute. 
90. "A statute is an instrument of government partaking of its practical purposes but 
also of its infirmities and limitations, of its awkward and groping efforts. . . . Moreover, 
government sometimes solves problems by shelving them temporarily. The legislative pro? 
cess reflects that attitude. Statutes as well as constitutional provisions at times embody 
purposeful ambiguity or are expressed with a generality for future unfolding." Frank? 
furter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes 6-7 (1947). This lecture of 
Frankfurter's is shot through with the conflict between the theoretically restricted function 
of the courts and the practical necessities of carrying on government with a limping legislative 
process. This conflict he neither expressly admits nor resolves. 
91. The Fair Labor Standards Act was but a first groping effort to regulate a myriad 
of complex situations. After fifteen years of experience, more precise provisions helped 
clarify and crystallize the1 law as to some of the more troublesome problems. The Wagner 
Act went little beyond a declaration of rights stated with the terseness of a constitutional 
document. After ten years, the Taft-Hartley Act embarked on a new experiment, creating 
more ambiguities than it resolved. 
92. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes 8 (1947). 
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Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, the Court had to decide whether an employer, 
who had refused to hire men because of union membership, could be compelled 
to employ them and give them back pay.93 Frankfurter looked to the broad 
purpose of the Wagner Act to encourage collective bargaining; he looked 
to employer practices that had led to the passage of the act, including the 
notorious blacklists; and he found that discrimination at the point of hire 
was as destructive of the purpose of the statute as discrimination after 
hiring. The force ful thrust of his argument and his skillful manipulation of 
statutory words 94 obscure the technique?his statement of the purpose of 
the act had swept all other considerations before it. The drafters of the 
statute, acutely conscious of the traditional reluctance of courts to compel 
performance of personal service contracts, had dared to make explicit only 
a single provision: employers could be compelled to retain old employees.95 
Frankfurter used the momentum of purpose to carry the conclusion a step 
further: workers with whom the employer had never entered into the employ? 
ment relationship could be protected. 
His method may at times be even bolder. When the Court was faced 
with the question whether section 8(d) of Taft-Hartley barred a union from 
striking at the reopening period of the contract, he did not belabor either the 
statutory words or legislative intent.96 The provision was obviously ambig? 
uous ; Congress had never even considered the problem.97 Frankfurter looked 
to the practical consequences of each alternative. To hold that the strike 
violated 8(d) was to deny the union any recourse to economic force on re? 
opening?a result which seemed to him incongruous with collective bargain? 
ing.98 More significantly, he gave great weight to a proposal made by Senator 
93. 313 U.S. 177 (1941). 
94. The troublesome phrase, "including reinstatement. . . with or without back pay" be? 
came merely an "illustrative application" of the "versatile principle" that the Board could 
order such affirmative action as would "effectuate the policies of the Act." Id. at 189. 
95. The drafters apparently were afraid that if nothing were said about compelling 
employment, the courts would say that such a radically new remedy was not implied in the 
general phrase, "effectuate the policies of the Act." On the other hand, if they explicitly 
provided that employers could be compelled to employ workers never employed previously, 
the provision would be challenged by Congress. They carefuliy chose their words, made 
explicit but half and with Frankfurter's help obtained the whole. 
96. NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 294 (1957) (concurring in part). 
97. He indicated the1 ambiguity by pointing out four distinct interpretations which had 
been suggested by various members of the Board and the lower federal courts, none of 
which had gained general acceptance. Id. at 297. 
98. Nothing, of course, prevents the parties from expressly providing in their contract 
that there shall be no recourse to economic force at reopening. Such a provision would 
then bring to bear both ? 8(d) and ? 301. Thus, the character of the reopening is left to 
the bargaining process. In United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 
395, 413 (1947) (dissenting opinion), Frankfurter looked past the explicit words of the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act, reviewed the whole history of union liability for acts of its members 
and officers and laid great emphasis on the practical consequences of the majority opinion. 
All of these were skillfully interwoven to screen the troublesome statutory language. 
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Taft and the Joint Committee on Labor Management Relations two years 
after the passage of the act." This subsequent solution, never passed by 
Congress, was recommended to the Court by Frankfurter to be written by 
judicial decision into the act. 
The creative function was used to a somewhat different end in United 
States v. UAW.100 Here Frankfurter viewed section 302; he considered 
its restrictions upon political expenditures in historical perspective and traced 
the long line of legislation controlling political contributions and expenditures 
both by individuals and corporations. The fears and ideals flowing through 
the debates for over fifty years were laid bare, and this section was revealed 
as another step in an unfolding process of avoiding "the deleterious influences 
on federal elections resulting from the use of money by those who exercise 
control over large aggregations of capital."101 He did not add to the reach 
of the statute, for the same result might well have been reached by a process 
of logical deduction from the bare words. His contribution was that of ex? 
amination beyond the words to unearth the policy in its historical depth. He 
did not interpret according to the mind of the Eightieth Congress; many 
of its members would be helpfully enlightened by reading the opinion. In the 
very best sense, this is "to give meaning to what Congress has done."102 
These examples suggest the depth and breadth of Frankfurter's approach. 
He looks to the historical line of development, the needs out of which the 
statute grew and even to subsequent events and present practical needs?in 
short, to the whole legal and social environment of a statute. In his own ambig? 
uous words, "nothing that is logically relevant should be excluded."103 
Clearly, he goes beyond the minds of the men who drafted or enacted the 
statute. He patches, enlarges and fulfills their awkward product. 
Frankfurter includes within the context for interpretation values which he 
considers so basic to our scheme of government, legal pattern or moral sense 
that Congress should be presumed to have them in mind.104 In Kirschbaum Co. 
v. Walling, the concern for preserving state power was overtly weighed in 
determining the reach of the Fair Labor Standards Act: "[T]he underlying 
assumptions of our dual form of government . . . cut across what might other- 
99. NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 299-300 (1957). In United States v. UMW, 
330 U.S. 258, 307 (1947) (concurring opinion), he was faced with a statutory gap in the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act created by the subsequent use of the seizure device. To reinforce 
his conclusion, he looked to congressional debates ten years later which involved the War 
Labor Disputes Act. 
100. 352 U.S. 567 (1957). 
101. Id. at 585. 
102. See text at notes 92-94 supra. 
103. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes 23 (1947). 
104. See id. at 21-22. Manifestations of this run through his opinions. See, e.g., United 
States v. Witkovitch, 353 U.S. 194 (1957) ; United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179 (1956) ; 
Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U;S. 521, 533 (1950) (dissenting opinion). 
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wise be the implied range of the legislation."105 Similarly, the Court wrote into 
the Railway Labor Act an implied obligation on the majority union not to 
discriminate in its bargaining,106 and even the express words of the Norris- 
LaGuardia Act were overridden by this presumed intent.10* Nor does Frank? 
furter stop with values which approach a constitutional level. Collective bar? 
gaining is such a dominant statutory policy that it is implicit in all related 
statutes. Thus, in the famous "overtime on overtime" case, he protested: 
"The presupposition of the Act was that .... the traditional process of col? 
lective bargaining was not to be disturbed where it existed."108 Again, a 
veteran's right to re-employment under the Selective Service Act was qualified 
by the union's right to give superseniority to union officers. "[I]t would 
be an undue restriction of the process of collective bargaining (without com? 
pensating gain to the veteran) to forbid changes in collective bargaining 
arrangements which secure a fixed tenure for union chairmen-"109 The words 
of the statute may be bent also to avoid multiple penalties or other results which 
Frankfurter deems unduly harsh.110 These "presuppositions of legislative 
draftsmanship" are but additional fictions through which the Court functions 
as a coordinate law and policy maker. Frankfurter reads into the statute 
considerations which may never have occurred to the legislature. To speak 
of presumed intent beclouds the process, for the Court attempts no objective 
guess as to what Congress would have thought, had it thought. What Frank? 
furter says is that these values or policies are so basic, so integral a part 
of our social and legal pattern, that Congress cannot deny or destroy them 
without thinking. The Court will protect these values at least until Congress 
has given them the deliberate consideration which is evidenced by explicit 
statutory words. The Court does not block Congress; it only checks its 
thoughtlessness. 
The central theme in Frankfurter's statutory construction is the search 
for purpose?the policy which Congress has chosen. In labor legislation, as 
in all legislation, this task can be treacherous, for the purposes may easily be 
105. 316 U.S. 517, 521 (1942). See also 10 East 40th Street Bldg., Inc. v. Callus, 325 
U.S. 578 (1945). The whole group of preemption cases implicitly involve this same prob? 
lem, for the exclusion of the! states depends upon the presumed intent of Congress. How? 
ever, Frankfurter has not been so consistent in those cases. See text at note 154 infra. 
106. Steele v. Louisville & N. Ry., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). However, he would not carry 
this principle so far as to hold an employer liable under the Wagner Act for the union's 
abusive use of its closed shop contract. See Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 257 
(1944) (dissenting opinion by Jackson) ; Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 
355 (1949). 
107. Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949). 
108. Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446,487 (1948) (dissenting opinion). 
109. Aeronautical Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 529 (1949). 
110. See United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 222 (1952) 
(continuing violation of FLSA does not constitute separate criminal offense for each 
day) ; Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 719 (1945) (dissenting opinion by 
Stone, C.J.). But see United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 705 (1948) (dissenting 
opinion). 
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misstated U1 or imagined.112 Moreover, labor legislation has certain character? 
istics which make the search for purpose particularly treacherous. First, labor 
legislation commonly does not have a single purpose?it has a complex of 
purposes, none of which is carried to its logical limits. Frankfurter's opinions 
frequently ignore this complexity in favor of a single-minded search. In 
Brooks v. NLRB, the employer refused to continue bargaining with a certified 
union which had been directly repudiated by the employees without any en- 
couragement from the employer.113 Two policies of the statute collided: the 
freedom of employees to choose their bargaining representative and the sta? 
bility of bargaining relationships. The statute did not draw the line of balance. 
Frankfurter ignored this conflict and found a simple, all-inclusive purpose: 
"The underlying purpose of this statute is industrial peace. To allow employers 
to rely on employees' rights in refusing to bargain with the formally designated 
union is not conducive to that end, it is inimical to it."114 The same pattern of 
reasoning underlies his dissent in Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley.115 The union 
had settled certain grievances for back pay with the employer, but the indi? 
viduals to whom the pay was owing sued the employer; they claimed the union 
had no authority to make a binding settlement. Frankfurter argued that the 
purpose of the Railway Labor Act was to provide a process of negotiation 
between unions and employers for the amicable settlement of disputes. Lack 
of authority in the union to make a binding settlement hindered this purpose. 
The majority, however, found that Congress did not intend to carry this 
single purpose to the limits of its logic. It did not intend "to submerge wholly 
the individual and minority interests . . . in the collective interest and 
agency."116 It had a qualifying purpose of "preserving the individual work- 
man's right to have a voice . . . in the settlement of claims arising out of 
his employment."117 
111. See, e.g., United States v. Carbone, 327 U.S. 633 (1946). Union ofncers had been 
indicted under the Kickback Act for requiring employees on government projects to pay 
"permit fees" and then pocketing the money. The majority defined the statutory purpose 
as the prevention of underpayment of wages by employers and dismissed the indictment. 
Frankfurter, dissenting, defined the purpose to be "to protect forays against wages derived 
from federal funds." Id. at 644. 
112. In Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 289 (1956), Frankfurter, in 
dissent, reinforced his conclusion that the loss of status provision in ? 8(d) of Taft-Hartley 
applied to unfair labor practice strikers who struck during the term of the* contract by 
taking "judicial notice" that "Congress may have set a very high value on peaceful adjust? 
ment" Id. at 297. He thus found an implied purpose to discourage economic self-help 
where legal remedies were available?a rather startling innovation that is difficult to square 
with other provisions of the statute. 
113. 34$ U.S. 96 (1954). 
114. Id. at 103. 
115. 325 U.S. 711, 749 (1945), modified on rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946). 
116. Id. at 733. 
117. Id. at 741. Frankfurter's opinion in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 
(1941), represents the extreme in stating broadly the legislative purpose1 and then follow? 
ing it to its logical conclusion without any acknowledgement that Congress may have had 
a less ambitious goal. 
This content downloaded  on Tue, 12 Mar 2013 00:05:35 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
288 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol.67:266 
A second and most significant characteristic of labor statutes is that they 
deal with an area where conflicting passions are deep, economic interests great 
and political forces strong. This greatly aggravates the difficulties in defining 
the purposes or in reconciling the cross-purposes imbedded in the statute. 
Legislation in the area is often possible only because it is skillfully ambiguous 
in not resolving the clash of interests. Frankfurter vividly describes this 
process in tracing the legislative history of the Clayton Act and concludes, 
"talk about the legislative intent as a means of construing legislation is simply 
repeating an empty formula. The Supreme Court had to find meaning where 
Congress had done its best to conceal meaning."118 In this respect, labor 
legislation bears a resemblance to collective agreements. It may dispose of 
the most difficult problems with ambiguous provisions which only postpone 
settlement. In collective bargaining, these problems may ultimately be thrown 
to an arbitrator to resolve; Congress may similarly push its problems to the 
courts.119 This may account for the extended litigation on certain sections of 
Taft-Hartley, particularly sections 8(d) and 304. Interpretation of such sec? 
tions is not furthered by searching for the touchstone of purpose; the Court 
must often decide where Congress refused.120 
In addition, the emotional and political climate in which labor legislation 
is born often leads to unusually poor draftsmanship. The judicial floundering in 
section 301 reveals the boggy wasteland resulting from congressional failure 
to recognize the difficult legal problems involved. The whole history of the 
Taft-Hartley Act is replete with examples of legal misconceptions on the part 
of those who were patching together the statute. Frankfurter, in his dissent in 
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, displays the dangers inherent in reading 
such statutes too closely.121 He fails into the trap of assuming that Congress 
understood fully and precisely the existing law and that it would include no 
unnecessary or duplicating words.122 This assumption denies political reality 
118. Frankfurter & Greene, The Labor Injunction 145 (1930). Speaking of the 
decisions under the Clayton Act, Frankfurter says significantly: "Statutory construction 
in doubtful cases, in the last analysis, is a choice among competing policies as starting 
points for reasoning." Id. at 169. 
119. A clear example of legislative irresolution is the failure to make any provision for 
multiple employer bargaining. See Truck Drivers Union v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 
1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 87 (1957). The legislative history suggests that since no explicit 
agreement could be reached, the solution was postponed; but time only increased the poli? 
tical heat around industry-wide1 bargaining. Finally, the Court had to decide a basic policy 
issue which may vitally affect the future character of our collective bargaining structure. 
120. Congress may shift the problems to an administrative agency as well as to the 
courts. Where statutory interpretation is involved, Frankfurter has often given decisive 
weight to interpretations by the NLRB. See, e.g., NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 
U.S. 264 (1956) ; NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322, 326 (1951) (dissent? 
ing opinion). However, neither the Wage-Hour Administrator nor the Social Security 
Board has fared so well. See Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946) ; Ad- 
dison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc, 322 U.S. 607 (1944). 
121. 350 U.S. 270, 289 (1956). 
122. Frankfurter's reasoning seems to assume that NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 
332 (1939), made all economic strikes during the term of the contract wholly unprotected 
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and diverts attention from the difficulty of giving meaning to what Congress 
has done. 
Another characteristic of labor legislation, one vitally affecting the func? 
tion of the courts, is its heavy inertia, to change. For over fifty years, Congress 
has refused to decide whether unions should be subject to the antitrust laws. 
Whatever the Court decides, as in Duplex123 or Hutcheson,124 is allowed to 
stand. In twenty years, only one substantial statute dealing with labor-manage- 
ment relations has been enacted?the Taft-Hartley Act. In ten years, this 
act has revealed ambiguities which require resolution of basic policies, but 
Congress has failed to clarify. Jurisdictional disputes, "hot cargo" clauses, the 
"ally doctrine," union shop in the construction industry and organizational 
picketing?these are but a few problems that cry out for legislative answers; 
still, Congress does nothing. 
This legislative paralysis forces on the Court the burden of molding out- 
moded and makeshift statutes to present needs. The Court cannot shrug off 
all responsibility for the practical wisdom of its decision with the casual 
attitude that if the result is bad Congress can change it. No matter which 
way Hutcheson had been decided, congressional action was unlikely. The 
wisdom of that decision and its economic impact are at least in part the Court's 
responsibility. But Frankfurter denies that the Court can or should assume 
such responsibility.125 
Blindness to the political reality of legislative inertia leads to decisions like 
Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd.12Q Statutory language and a measure of 
legislative history supported the holding that the states were excluded from 
activity so that the Board had no power to order reinstatement and that this was so cle&r 
Congress would not waste words to crystallize the rule. He further assumes that NLRB 
v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939), did not bar the Board from ordering 
reinstatement of employees discharged for violating the act or for other misconduct, if the 
employer had been guilty of an antecedent unfair labor practice and the Board found that 
reinstatement would effectuate the purposes of the act. Valid as this assumption may be, 
there is serious reason to doubt whether the drafters of the statute had so precisely under- 
stood the law. See Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 Ind. LJ. 319, 
324 (1951). 
123. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). 
124. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941). 
125. During the last term the Court was twice faced with the question whether the 
twenty-five year old Norris-LaGuardia Act barred equitable relief when one party to the 
collective agreement refused to submit grievances to arbitration. He agreed that the em? 
ployer could enjoin a union which ignored a statutory arbitration process. Brotherhood 
of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957). But he insisted that a 
union could not enjoin an employer who ignored a contractual arbitration process. Textile 
Workets Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957) (dissenting opinion). A clear 
recognition of responsibility for the practical result might have prevented such a distribu? 
tion. Similarly, in Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 289 (1956), if Frank? 
furter in his dissent had looked to the result, he might have hesitated to hold that an unfair 
labor practice charge with its delays and limited effectiveness was an adequate substitute 
for economic measures of self-help. 
126. 353 U.S. 1 (1957). 
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regulating even though the Board had refused to exercise jurisdiction. The 
drafters of Taft-Hartley had hoped that the states would follow their leader? 
ship and perhaps intended to prod them into line. However, this purpose did 
not find fulfillment. Although the "no man's land" problem became painfully 
evident, Congress stood silent. The NLRB, the state boards and the courts 
began to evolve tolerably workable solutions to fill the vacuum. The Supreme 
Court, destroying all of this in Guss, said, "Congress is free to change the 
situation at will."127 But practically, Congress will not do so. After six 
months, no action is yet in sight; conduct which violates both state and federal 
law goes wholly untouched.128 Had the Court upheld the power of the state 
instead of resurrecting a dead purpose, no violence would have been done to 
the statute; the democratic process would have suffered no derogation, and 
a year of disruption of state labor law would have been avoided.129 
These characteristics of labor legislation impose on the courts a heavy 
responsibility which Frankfurter's whole articulate judicial philosophy rejects 
as improper for judges and the judicial process. Ideally, he is right; however, 
little is gained by deploring the defects of the legislative branch or by insisting 
on "fit legislation." Ultimately, the courts must decide, using whatever in- 
complete and awkward statutes have been provided. This does not mean 
that judges should depart on frolics of their own. The core of their function 
is, as Frankfurter has rightly emphasized, not to make policy but to construe 
and implement legislative policy, and the very character of labor legislation 
accentuates the need for a constant consciousness of self-subordination. Frank? 
furter's contextual method of interpretation, his accentuation of historical 
perspective and his deliberate judicial humility provide the essentials for the 
difficult task. He is handicapped only by his inability to admit the reality of an 
unwanted responsibility. 
Judicial Self-Protection 
The constitutional principle of separation of powers contains two distinct 
policies?one, the prevention of dangerous concentration of power, the other, 
the allocation of functions to appropriate branches. To Frankfurter, the Court's 
function in allocation is clear. In his concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure case, 
127. Id. at 11. 
128. Even the more prosaic principles of interpretation should have given pause. The 
claimed congressional purpose" was national uniformity, but the decision brought a curious 
uniformity whereby conduct prohibited by both federal and state laws goes unrestrained 
by either. Can the Court so cavalierly dismiss "budgetary reasons" as irrelevant, when 
historically Congress has used control of the purse strings as a device of policy making? 
The Board's jurisdictional policy based on leaving broader areas of control to the* states 
was known to Congress and was accepted as the basis for its appropriation. To ignore all 
this is not to implement but to frustrate the legislative will. 
129. Compare with this the Court's action in the Buffalo Linen case. NLRB v. Truck 
Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957), reversing 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956). The policy 
choice there was on the side of preserving the existing system of multiple employer bar? 
gaining and confirming the right of employers to counteract whipsawing by sympathetic 
lockouts. 
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he asserts that "the judiciary may . . . have to intervene in determining where 
authority lies as between the democratic forces in our scheme of government" 
when a contest arises between them.130 He admits in passing that the Presi? 
dent's power may be enlarged by congressional grant or contracted by con? 
gressional prohibition. But he does not suggest the Court's conclusion if the 
two political branches should agree to combine their power in one or the 
other branch.131 Going no further than the case required, he rules that where 
Congress clearly prohibits seizure the President cannot seize and that the 
Court can enforce the congressional command by enjoining the executive.132 
Allocation of functions has at its roots the problem of determining the areas 
of competence of each branch. Although Frankfurter is reluctant to limit or 
deny the competence of the political branches, he does not shrink from doubting 
the competence of the judicial branch. The most appropriate function of the 
Court, he feels, is to protect itself from tasks which are not appropriate for 
judicial determination. 
Two of Frankfurter's most controversial opinions carry overtones of such 
judicial self-protection. In The Labor Injunction, Frankfurter forcefully 
demonstrated that by determining the legality of union conduct, courts would be 
making rules to govern the struggle between employers and workers "for their 
respective shares in the goods of the world and in their much more subtle 
rivalry for power in the conduct of industry."133 Concerted action, in its 
manifold forms and purposes, raises "bristling issues of policy" concerning 
the cost of economic contest.134 "Primarily, this is the task of legislatures."135 
This statement echoed Brandeis's dissent in Duplex when he said: 
"The conditions developed in industry may be such that those engaged 
in it cannot continue their struggle without danger to the community. 
But it is not for judges to determine whether such conditions exist, nor 
is it their function to set the limits of permissible contest and to declare 
the duties which the new situation demands. This is the function of the 
legislature . . . ."186 
In short, such policy making was not an appropriate judicial function. The 
Norris-LaGuardia Act was conceived by Frankfurter as a legislative declara? 
tion of policy and as a definition of the permissible limits of concerted action.137 
130. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 597 (1952). 
131. Frankfurter explicitly recognizes the "hazards of concentrated power" but then 
falls into unhelpful phrasemaking?"the Framers, however, did not make the judiciary the 
overseer of our government"?and embarks on a discursive sermon on judicial humility. 
Id. at 593-94. 
132. He found the congressional prohibition implicit in the wording and legislative 
history of the Taft-Hartley provisions concerning national emergency strikes, and also 
found that prohibition was not qualified by the Defense Production Act of 1950. Id. at 
599, 607. 
133. Frankfurter & Greene, The Labor Injunction 203 (1930). 
134. Id. at 204. 
135. Id. at 205. 
136. Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 488 (1921). 
137. See Frankfurter & Greene, The Labor Injunction 215-20 (1930). 
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The Court, in United States v. Hutcheson, was again pressed to become a 
policy maker under the guise of enforcing the Sherman Act.138 Congress had 
provided no guide. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, decided the year before, 
initiated new standards, but they threatened to revive the common-law concepts 
of restraint of trade which in labor cases had cloaked judicial policy-mak? 
ing;139 and Thurman Arnold, as Assistant Attorney General, had mounted 
his Sherman Act charger for a crusade against "unreasonable restraints" by 
unions for "illegitimate objectives."140 Frankfurter's decision was an act of 
judicial self-protection saving the Court from having thrust upon it the 
legislative function of making national labor policy. 
A variation of the same theme runs through Frankfurter's dissent in Tex? 
tile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills.1*1 Here, he states his premise explicitly: 
"[T]he Court has deemed itself peculiarly qualified, with due regard to the 
contrary judgment of Congress, to determine what is meet and fit for the 
exercise of * judicial power' as authorized by the Constitution."142 Congress 
declared that collective agreements should be enforceable in the federal courts, 
but it left all of the difficult problems unanswered, The Court was asked to 
fashion a "whole industrial code" or "federal common law of labor contracts" 
with no guides but "judicial inventiveness."143 Federal interpretations of 
contracts would eventually collide with state interpretations, but Congress 
gave no hint how this clash should be resolved. The Court had further to 
create a whole structure of procedures and standards to enforce arbitration 
awards without any direction as to the application of the Arbitration Act. In 
short, Congress failed to meet its responsibility and east the burden of law- 
making on the Court. At some point, the Court is entitled to rule that legis- 
lating is for Congress and that the judicial branch should not be saddled with 
functions which are not within its sphere of competence. For Frankfurter, 
this point was reached:144 "[A] refusal by the Justices to perform a function 
138. 312 U.S. 219 (1941). 
139. 310 U.S. 469 (1940). 
140. After Apex and before Hutcheson, Arnold had described the types of union activ? 
ity which he intended to prosecute as including "(1) Unreasonable restraints designed to 
prevent the use of cheaper material, improved equipment, or more efficient methods . . . 
(2) . . . to compel the hiring of useless and unnecessary labor ... (3) . . . to enforce 
systems of graft and corruption ... (4) ... to enforce illegally fixed prices ... (5) . . . 
to destroy an established and legitimate' system of collective bargaining." N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 20, 1939, p. 1, col. 4. These goals involved problems bristling with policy far more 
thorny than any which Frankfurter sought to remove from the courts by the Norris-La? 
Guardia Act. 
141. 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957). 
142. Id. at 464-65. 
143. Id. at 465-66. 
144. Frankfurter makes the Court's task appear much more onerous than it is. First, 
the industrial code has already been largely fashioned by both state and federal courts over 
a period of forty years, all without legislative' guidance. The Supreme Court itself has 
already contributed substantially. See NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282 (1957) ; Mastro 
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956) ; NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 
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imposed upon them by Congress because of the non-judicial nature of that 
function" was justified.145 
In neither of these cases did Frankfurter build a constitutional wall of 
separation; he did not state that Congress could not constitutionally impose 
these burdens on the Court.146 What he did say was that at least the Court 
can refuse to assume these duties until Congress has thoroughly considered 
the problems and clearly determined that they are for the courts.147 This, in a 
sense, was a remand to Congress for reconsideration of the problems which 
the Court had found. 
The Decline of Federalism 
One of the essential functions of the Court, Frankfurter has declared, is 
"striking the balance between the respective spheres of federal and state 
power."148 Where powers are distributed between the center and constituent 
units by a written constitution, conflicts as to the distribution of power "become 
legal issues to be resolved by a judicial and not a political tribunal"; the Court 
becomes the "inevitable mechanism of a federal state."149 
If the Court is to act as an arbiter of the federal system, it must play a dual 
role. It must protect the nation from disintegration by state power; and it 
must protect the states from being smothered by national power. In a highly 
integrated economy subject to extensive government control, these roles con- 
345 U.S. 71 (1953) ; Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945) ; J. I. Case Co. v. 
NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) ; NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939). In some of 
these cases, Frankfurter himself had theorized about the nature of collective agreements 
or interpreted their terms. Second, resolution of the clash of federal and state power is left 
no more unresolved here than elsewhere in Taft-Hartley, and the correlation of the two is 
probably not as difficult, for substantial uniformity is a practical possibility, and the state 
courts can follow federal law. Third, a less rigid approach to statutory interpretation 
could have made the Federal Arbitration Act applicable. See, e.g., Local 205, United 
Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Corp., 233 F.2d 85 (lst Cir. 1956). Frankfurter rebels 
at a job which thousands of other judges have been doing for years. But see Bickel & 
Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1957). 
145. 353 U.S. at 464. 
146. Although Frankfurter in Lincoln Mills finds ? 301 unconstitutional for want of 
a federal question, he concedes that if Congress had clearly declared that federal sub? 
stantive law was to apply, this constitutional obstacle would have been overcome. In spite 
of his strong language, he does not carry through to an explicit statement that the section 
unconstitutionally burdens the Court because of its vagueness. 
147. Frankfurter recognizes that in the Fair Labor Standards Act Congress left to the 
Court the problem of marking out the boundaries of the statute without any helpful guides. 
10 East 40th Street Bldg., Inc. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578 (1945). However, since he sees 
this as arbitrating between state and federal power, it imposes no inappropriate function 
on the Court. 
148. Frankfurter, Some Observations on the Nature of the Judicial Process of Supreme 
Court Litigation, 98 Proceedings, American Philosophical Society 233, 236 (1954), 
reprinted in Of Law and Men 31, 38. 
149. Frankfurter, The Supreme Court of the United States, 14 Encyclopaedia of the 
Social Sciences 474, 475 (1934), reprinted in Law and Politics 21, 23. 
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flict, and accommodation must be made. In spite of his words, Frankfurter 
gives the Court but a supporting role in making the accommodation and leaves 
ultimate control in the hands of Congress. 
In Polish Nafl Alliance v. NLRB, he declared it the duty of the Court 
to protect the states from "absorption of legislative power by the United 
States over every activity."150 However, what affects commerce "the Consti? 
tution entrusts primarily and very largely to Congress, subject to the elec- 
torate."151 The Court can determine only whether Congress has "exceeded 
limits allowable in reason," whether the activities are "related to commerce 
merely by gossamer threads and not by solid ties."152 These words make 
reasonably clear that the Court provides no practical bar to the reach of 
congressional power. The only effective check is the political check.158 
The difficult problem in labor law, however, is not the reach of federal 
power but the survival of state power. The question is not whether Congress 
can grant or deny power to the states, but whether it has done so. Theoretically, 
the problem is one of statutory interpretation, but Frankfurter's conception that 
the Court has a special responsibility to mediate between state and nation 
gives him a greater sense of freedom. Since Congress is most often stubbornly 
silent or deliberately obtuse, the result he reaches is strongly colored by his 
conception of the proper relations between the state and federal governments. 
In meeting these problems, Frankfurter is ambiguous. On the one hand, 
he conceives of the Court as a protector of the national interests and is fond 
of quoting Holmes's statement: 
"I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our 
power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would 
be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the 
several states. For one in my place sees how often a local policy prevails 
with those who are not trained to national views and how often action 
is taken that embodies what the Commerce Clause was meant to end."154 
On the other hand, he echoes the view of his second idol, Brandeis, who 
vigorously opposed concentrations of power and championed the freedom of 
states to meet their special needs and provide laboratories for social experi- 
150. 322 U.S. 643, 650 (1944). 
151. Ibid. 
152. Ibid. 
153. Compare Frankfurter's statement in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 
581-82 (1946), suggesting that a state claim of immunity from federal taxation "raises 
questions not wholly unlike provisions of the Constitution, such as that of Art. IV, ? 4 
guaranteeing States a republican form of government, . . . which this Court has deemed 
not within its duty to adjudicate." 
154. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 295-96 (1920), quoted in Frankfurter, John 
Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 217, 219 (1955), reprinted in Of 
Law and Men 3, 6; Frankfurter, The Supreme Court of the United States, 14 Encyclo- 
paedia of the Social Sciences 474, 475 (1934), reprinted in Law and Politics 21, 23; 
Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes, 21 Dictionary of Am. Biography 417, 423 (Supp. One, 
1944), reprinted in Of Law and Men 158, 173. 
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ment. Frankfurter's use of this value in interpreting statutes has already 
been described.155 His opinions in the preemption cases have wavered under 
the tug and haul of these two deeply held beliefs. 
In the earlier preemption cases, Frankfurter vigorously protested against 
erosion of state power by implications from the Wagner Act. In Hill v. Florida, 
he defended the state's right to enjoin a union from functioning until it had 
complied with the state licensing statute.156 In Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New 
York State Labor Relations Bd., he affirmed the power of the National Board 
to cede jurisdiction to state boards.157 Finally, he asserted the right of 
Wisconsin to enforce compulsory arbitration in local utilities despite pro? 
visions in Taft-Hartley requiring the employer to bargain, afftrming the right 
to strike and curtailing national emergency strikes.158 Through all these 
decisions ran the recurring theme most forcefully expressed in the Bethlehem 
Steel case: 
"Congress needs no help from generous judicial implications to achieve 
the supersession of State authority. To construe federal legislation so as 
not needlessly to forbid preexisting State authority is to respect our 
federal system. Any indulgence in construction should be in favor of the 
States, because Congress can speak with drastic clarity whenever it 
chooses to assure full federal authority, completely displacing the 
States."159 
The shift in the Court's approach to the preemption cases was marked by 
Garner v. Teamsters Union1? and in this decision Frankfurter joined. For 
him too, it marked the end of attempts to preserve the state's power to regulate 
labor conflicts. In Garner, the state was wholly excluded from all regulation 
of peaceful picketing?a matter traditionally subject to local control. The 
state power was destroyed not by any explicit statutory words or legislative 
history but by an implication drawn from congressional prohibition of certain 
types of picketing. Prohibition of some picketing implied that states should 
not prohibit any other?a rather generous judicial implication to achieve 
supersession of state authority.161 Frankfurter not only remained silent in 
155. See text at notes 90, 133 supra. 
156. 325 U.S. 538 (1945). Where a New York statute compelled a union of federal 
postal employees to admit Negroes, he dismissed the preemption problem as "to unsub- 
stantial to require consideration." Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 98 (1945). 
157. 330 U.S. 767 (1947). See also Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301 (1949), upholding the right of the state under the 
Wagner Act to condition union security clauses on a two-thirds vote of all employees. 
However, Frankfurter refused to approve the Michigan strike vote law because it was to 
be enforced against the* nationwide Chrysler Corporation and provided for a vote by only 
those employees in the bargaining unit in Michigan. UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950). 
158. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951). 
159. 330 U.S. at 780. For similar expressions in nonlabor cases, see Rice v. Sante Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 241 (1947) ; Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 
148, 178 (1942). But see California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949). 
160. 346 U.S. 485 (1953). 
161. Id. at 499-500. 
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Garner, he adopted its language and logic in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.1Q2 
The fire of his opinions in Hill v. Florida and Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New 
York State Labor Relations Bd. was gone. Congress did not need to "speak 
with drastic clarity," for it had "sufficiently expressed its purpose to bring 
it within federal oversight."163 His concern was to protect the federal authority 
from any actual or potential conflict with state power. Finally, in his subdued 
dissent in UMW v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., he hinted at his problem of 
reconciling the positions of Holmes and Brandeis: 
"Decisions ultimately depend on judgment in balancing overriding con? 
siderations making for the requirement of an exclusive nationwide regime 
in a particular field of legal control and respect for the allowable area with? 
in which the forty-eight States may enforce their diverse notions of 
policy."164 
The culmination was Frankfurter's joinder in the Guss decision?a final 
reduction of state power over labor controversies to the constitutional de 
minimis. It is difficult to believe that either the Eightieth Congress or the 
Eighty-fifth Congress intended such centralization of control. The only 
surmise can be that Frankfurter, the once stout defender of federalism in 
labor relations, has now concluded that the complicated structure of Taft- 
Hartley places on the Court an intolerable burden of marking the lines between 
state and federal power. Stripping the states may prod Congress into making 
more explicit that which it intends to exclude. Ultimately, the problem is one 
of policy to be decided by Congress. 
The Court and Collective Bargaining 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's preoccupation with the role of the Court 
prevents any clear distillation of his views on collective bargaining. In 
American Sash & Door, he upheld the power of the states to prohibit all 
forms of union security, but in Railway Employes3 Dep't, AFL v. Hanson,165 he 
affirmed the power of Congress to prohibit enforcement of the same state laws 
against railroad employees. The "hospitable scope" given to the Norris-La? 
Guardia Act in Hutcheson failed to encompass the subsequent injunction cases 
coming to the Court until the late date of Lincoln Mills.im Such seeming 
inconsistencies demonstrate that any pretense of drawing from his opinion 
a pattern of views on collective bargaining is hazardous. Whatever pattern 
is discoverable is at best rudimentary, for concern with larger concepts has 
blocked full development. 
162. 348 U.S. 468 (1955). He need not have gone so far, for the plaintifFs complaint 
in the state court had alleged a violation of ?? (A), (B) and (D) of ? 8(b) (4), and the 
Board had never passed on whether the conduct came within the first two subsections. He 
seems to imply that conduct protected by ? 7 from employer interference is also protected 
from state action?a position difficult to reconcile with his reasoning in Hill v. Florida. 
163. Id. at 481. 
164. 351 U.S. 62, 76 (1956). 
165. 351 U.S. 225 (1956). 
166. See text at note 19 supra. 
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Frankfurter is a deep believer in the process of free collective bargaining,167 
and this belief is fed by three converging theories. He sometimes emphasizes 
the Holmesian theory that combination of labor through unions is a natural 
and essential corollary of combination of capital through the corporation, which 
equalizes bargaining power between the two.168 Collective bargaining is the 
competitive system at work in the labor market. At other times, he echoes 
the Brandeis theory of diffusion of power through creating a system of "in? 
dustrial self-government" by the employer and union which reduces the 
necessity for concentrated power in the state. Unexpressed in his opinions is 
his earliest theory that collective bargaining is a part of the democratic process 
through which workers participate in the direction of industry.169 Frankfurter 
has not integrated these three theories into any coordinated concept, but in his 
opinions the Brandeis theory dominates. 
The "industrial self-government" concept leads Frankfurter to insist that 
the structures and rules developed through collective bargaining not be dis- 
rupted?that private government be allowed to govern. This tendency was 
most marked in the "portal to portal" and "overtime on overtime" dissents. 
"No time is a good time needlessly to sap the principle of collective bargaining 
or to disturb harmonious and fruitful relations between employers and em? 
ployees brought about by collective bargaining."170 He protested vigorously 
against these decisions as "heedless of long-standing and socially desirable 
collective agreements."171 In Aeronautical Industrial Lodge v. Campbell,172 
he was not content with finding that the collective agreement did not discrimin? 
ate against veterans by giving superseniority to union officers. He went beyond 
to justify such seniority agreements by showing their contribution to the bar? 
gaining process from which the veterans benefited. 
The same hostility to legal intervention in this autonomous system brought 
forth his outburst against judicial enforcement of collective agreements in 
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills. "[T]he meaning of collective bargaining 
for labor does not remotely derive from reliance on the sanction of litigation 
in the courts. . . . [J]udicial intervention is ill-suited to the special character? 
istics of the arbitration process in labor disputes . . . ."173 Any rule developed 
167. However, in Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947), he would 
have reversed the Board's holding that foremen were entitled to protection in organizing 
and bargaining collectively. The Wagner Act, he believed, was not intended to protect them. 
In NLRB v. E. C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398 (1947), he would also have reversed the 
Board's certification as representative of plant guards a union which also represented pro? 
duction workers. 
168. See AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 542, 545 (1949). 
169. See text at note 9 supra. 
170. Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 477 (1948). 
171. Id. at 478. But compare Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U.S. 427 (1945), 
where Frankfurter did not allow the existence of a collective agreement to excuse under- 
cutting FLSA standards. See also Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126 (1947). 
172. 337 U.S. 521 (1949). 
173. 353 U.S. at 462-63. 
This content downloaded  on Tue, 12 Mar 2013 00:05:35 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
298 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol.67:266 
by the courts "is more likely to discombobulate than to compose."174 He 
manifests no recognition that compelling arbitration in contrast to direct legal 
enforcement of the contract avoids the necessity of judicial intervention on the 
merits, that it is a device to make the autonomous system internally respon? 
sible.175 
Although he believes in collective bargaining, it is not clear that he considers 
the right to strike an inseparable part of the process. In Lion Oil, he spoke 
of the strike only as "a conventional factor in the collective-bargaining pro? 
cess."176 In UMW, he characterized the process of fixing terms and condi? 
tions of employment in the seized mines as one of collective bargaining, just 
as if the mines were in the hands of a receiver.177 The fact that workers in 
the seized mines could not strike was not even worth mentioning. Most 
telling is his dissent supporting the Wisconsin compulsory arbitration statute 
which not only barred strikes but prohibited the arbitrator from making an 
award which would "infringe upon the right of the employer to manage his 
business." He found in these provisions no serious incompatibility with collec? 
tive bargaining as conceived in the federal statute.178 
In this industrial self-government, Frankfurter accentuates the power of 
the union over the workers?the individual is all but submerged in the col? 
lective entity. The union, of course, has exclusive power to negotiate collective 
agreements which prescribe the rules governing the terms and conditions of 
employment. The crux of the problem is in the rights the individual obtains 
under the agreement. Frankfurter assumes that the collective agreement 
creates legal rights in the individual which he can enforce in the state courts, 
and on this point the Court is apparently in agreement.179 This leaves, how? 
ever, the crucial question whether the union can, without the consent of the 
individual, surrender such rights to the employer through the grievance 
procedure. In Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, the union settled back pay ciaims 
of a number of employees in return for prospective concessions by the em? 
ployer.180 The individual employees then brought suit. The Court held that 
under the Railway Labor Act the union could not make a binding settlement 
without the consent of the individuals. Frankfurter wrote two acid dissents 
suggesting that the decision "undermines the very conception of a collective 
174. Id. at 464. 
175. However, less than three months earlier he had joined in an opinion upholding 
an injunction against a union which struck to obtain settlement of grievances instead of 
submitting them to the National Railroad Adjustment Board with its interminable delays. 
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957). 
176. NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 298 (1957) (concurring in part). 
177. United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 320 (1947). 
178. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Bd, 340 U.S. 383, 399-410 (1951). 
179. See Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
348 U.S. 437, 460 (1955). 
180. 325 U.S. 711 (1945), modified on rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946). 
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agreement" and "reintroduces destructive individualism."181 The core of his 
dissent was that the bargaining structure developed by the parties would be 
disrupted. On rehearing, he cited as evidence the protest evoked by the first 
decision from all the major labor organizations. The Court's decision, he 
declared, "generally undermined the basis for all collective bargaining in regard 
to grievances" and "created havoc in the railroad world."182 
Admittedly, unions strongly prefer the maximum control over those they 
represent, and management frequently prefers to deal with those who have 
unqualified power. That collective bargaining requires such absolutism in 
disposing of rights created by the agreement does not follow, nor did Congress 
in enacting the .Railway Labor Act necessarily intend so wholly to submerge 
the individual. Even at the expense of collective convenience, Congress may 
have sought to preserve some status for the individual. As the majority 
pointed out, the act made a clear distinction between disputes over the forma? 
tion of contracts and disputes concerning the interpretation of existing agree? 
ments. Individual rights to confer with management, to be notified personally 
of hearings and to appear in person were explicitly provided. Frankfurter 
ignored all of these and, in the name of efficiency and orderliness in collective 
bargaining, would place the individual at the mercy of the collective entity. 
Frankfurter would not leave the union wholly unchecked, however; he 
would enforce the Steele doctrine that unions must not exercise their power 
in an arbitrary way against some minority interests.183 Bargaining representa? 
tives are "in what amounts to a fiduciary position" and they "owe a judicially 
enforceable duty of fairness to all components of the working force."184 This 
is, to Frankfurter, a broad principle. While he recognizes the difficulty of 
application?"conflict between majority and minority interests is a common- 
place in the whole collective bargaining process"185?he gives no suggestion 
of what tests he will apply or the mood in which he will weigh. The union's 
action represents a form of majority will reconciling conflicting values and 
interests in economic and business affairs, an area in which Frankfurter has 
often proclaimed judicial incompetence. If he carries over the attitudes with 
which he decides the parallel problems of substantive due process, the noble 
words will be little more than empty promises to all except racial minorities. 
If he recognizes that this private government lacks many of the political or 
procedural protections which add reliability to majority rule, he may search 
181. 325 U.S. at 758. 
182. 327 U.S. at 674. 
183. Steele v. Louisville & N. Ry., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Although he has written only 
one leading opinion in the series of cases following this decision, Aeronautical Industrial 
Lodge v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521 (1949), he has taken every opportunity to emphasize 
its impact. Thus, he joined in Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent in Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 
331 U.S. 40, 62 (1947), based on the doctrine. See also Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 
334 U.S. 446, 493 n.10 (1948) ; AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 546 
(1949). 
184. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Ryehlik, 77 Sup. Ct. 421, 430-31 (1957). 
185. Id. at 431. 
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more critically for signs of unfairness. But this approach will inject him into 
the bargaining relationship and may require him to make the very kind of 
judgments he has so consistently rejected. 
Frankfurter has never recognized that protecting the individuaTs right to 
his grievance is an aspect of protecting against unfairness. Contract pro? 
visions may be fair on their face yet be used as subtle instruments of op- 
pression by manipulative grievance settlements.186 The Steele doctrine stand? 
ing alone merely drives discrimination into the labyrinth of grievance handling 
where discovery is impossible. Only if an individual can insist that the agree? 
ment be enforced according to its terms does he have some hope of protecting 
himself from arbitrary use of power. Frankfurter has, in administrative pro? 
ceedings, recognized that requiring authority to be exercised in accordance 
with rules laid down in advance is one of the basic safeguards against arbitrari- 
ness.187 Where power is exercised by a collective entity such as a union, 
demanding adherence to expressed rules?here the contract?has special justi? 
fication in protecting against unfairness. 
Most marked is Frankfurter's idealization of the Railway Labor Act, which 
he characterizes as "an instrument of industrial government for railroading, 
by the industry itself, through the concentrated agencies of railroad executives 
and the railroad unions."188 He repeatedly recalls that "the railroads and the 
railroad unions between them wrote the Railway Labor Act of 1926 and 
Congress formally enacted their agreement."189 To Frankfurter, "the dominant 
inference . . . is the exclusion of the courts from this process of collaborative 
self-government."190 The industry should be allowed to govern itself without 
judicial intervention. 
The extent of his judicial hands-off attitude is exemplified in two opinions. 
In Order of Ry. Conductors v. Swan, the Conductors and the Trainmen 
claimed that all disputes concerning yardmasters should be heard by the first 
division of the Adjustment Board, on which they each had representatives.191 
The Railroad Yardmasters had failed to obtain a seat on any division of the 
Board; they claimed that these disputes should be heard by the fourth division, 
and the carriers joined in that claim. Since each division is made up of an 
equal number of union and carrier representatives, both were deadlocked by 
tie votes on the jurisdictional issue, and no grievance concerning Yardmasters 
could be processed. Faced by this stalemate, the Conductors sought a declara? 
tory judgment as to which division of the Board had been granted jurisdiction 
186. In many situations, the individuals or minorities singled out for unfair treatment 
cannot be grouped so as to make possible discrimination in writing the contracts. The 
greatest opportunity for disguised unfairness is in the arbitrary administration of proper 
provisions. 
187. - See, e.g., his joinder in Jackson's dissent in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 
209 (1947). 
188. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Rychlik, 77 Sup. Ct. 421, 431 (1957). 
189. Railway Employees, AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 240 (1956). 
190. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Rychlik, 77 Sup. Ct. 421, 430 (1957). 
191. 329 U.S. 520 (1947). 
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by the statute. Mr. Justice Frankfurter contended that since explicit command 
for judicial review was lacking, the dispute should be left to the mediatory 
machinery of the act. Even though that machinery was ineffective and the 
operation of the act had stagnated, the courts should not intrude to interpret 
the jurisdictional provisions of the statute. 
Frankfurter's unwillingness to intervene is further emphasized by his opinion 
in the recent Rychlik case.192 An employee had joined the United Railroad 
Operating Crafts?UROC?a union competing with the old-line brotherhoods. 
The Trainmen, which had a union shop, demanded his discharge because he 
did not belong to a union "national in scope" as prescribed by the statute. His 
discharge was upheld by the System Board of Adjustment, composed of two 
representatives each from the Trainmen and the carrier, which determined 
that UROC was not "national in scope." Frankfurter insisted that the courts 
had no jurisdiction to review. "The determination of the System Board on 
the merits is not open to judicial review, even on so-called legal questions. . . . 
Right or wrong, a court has no jurisdiction to review what the System Board 
did."193 
In short, this industrial self-government, created by Congress with powers 
and duties statutorily defined by Congress, is legally responsible to no one 
to stay within its statutory powers or procedures. Delegated power, in part 
supplanting judicial enforcement of individual rights, is left vagrant without 
legal dikes to confine it within its channels. The only legal check is the limited 
protection of the Steele doctrine. 
That Frankfurter, at times most insistent that administrative agencies com? 
ply strictly with their statutory grants, would give such unsupervised power 
to the Adjustment Board is surprising. Neither the Board's make-up nor its 
performance has earned it special judicial toleration. It consists of persons 
chosen and paid by those who are often parties to the proceedings. Neither 
the unions nor the carriers have evidenced concern for individual or minority 
rights, nor have they demonstrated great responsibility for society or even the 
well-being of the industry.194 Cases like Slocum and Whitehouse reveal them 
making a sheil game of the Board procedures.195 With an assist from Rychlik, 
192. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Rychlik, 77 Sup. Ct. 421 (1957). 
193. Id. at 431. 
194. For critical discussion of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, see Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doc. 
No. 10, 77th Cong., lst Sess., pt. IV (1941) ; Northrup & Kahn, Railroad Grievance Ma? 
chinery: A Critical Analysis?I and II, 5 Ind. & Lab. Rel, Rev. 365, 540 (1952) ; Rose, The 
Railway Labor Act: The Union Shop and Impartial Tribunals, 42 A.B.AJ. 35 (1956) ; 
Comment, Railroad Labor Disputes and the National Railroad Adjustment Board, 18 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 303 (1950). 
195. In Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 339 U.S. 239 (1950), the Railroad Tele- 
graphers and the Railway Clerks both claimed certain yard jobs. The employer assigned 
the jobs to Clerks, and the Telegraphers filed a back pay claim invoking the NRAB. The 
employer, naming both unions as defendants, sought a declaratory judgment in a state 
court as to which union was entitled to the jobs. The Court, Frankfurter concurring, held 
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they have choked off the only serious challenge to their ingrown craft separa- 
tism. Is it possible that Frankfurter has so often repeated that the railroad 
is a state within a state that he has been misled by metaphor into a misplaced 
economic federalism? 
Conclusion 
Professor Frankfurter has left an indelible mark on our labor law and 
collective bargaining. For more than twenty years before ascending the 
bench, he helped shape the law by which he should judge. Concurrently, he 
helped shape the judicial philosophy?the philosophy of Holmes, Brandeis and 
Cardozo?which has dominated his tenure on the Court. When he donned 
the robe, both of these frontiers had been largely won; the more difficult 
task of occupation and development remained. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has left few deep imprints in labor law with the 
exception of Hutcheson, Phelps Dodge and the railroad cases. His attitude 
toward administrative tribunals indirectly influenced the substantive law by 
giving a wide measure of freedom to the NLRB in finding the facts, interpret? 
ing the statute and fixing the remedies. If his contribution to labor law has 
been modest, it is because his conception of the creative function of the Court 
is modest. He does not seek to define the role of unions and collective bar? 
gaining in a democratic society; he seeks instead to define the role of the Court 
in a democratic society. 
His preoccupation with the role of the Court embodies a heavy residue of 
his own unhappy experiences in the minimum wage cases. He knows first 
hand the danger of willful judges who write their individual preferences into 
law. He would circumscribe the function of the Court to inhibit such judicial 
libertines in the future. Thus, he seeks eternal standards to control the Court 
?standards commanding obedience because they are based on fundamental 
principles of a democratic society. These principles derive from an unqualified 
reliance on the political process to resolve disputes where values conflict. The 
right to govern belongs solely to the elected legislature; for an oligarchic Court 
to set itself against the legislature or even act in its stead is a contradiction of 
democracy and politically indecent. The argument is reinforced by decrying the 
that exclusive jurisdiction was in the Board and dismissed the suit. The same two unions 
were involved in the same kind of dispute in Whitehouse v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 349 U.S. 
366 (1955). The1 employer again assigned the jobs to Clerks, and the Telegraphers again 
claimed back pay. The employer, learning from Slocum, prepared to go to the Board. 
However, it was notified by the Clerks that if the Telegraphers won and it gave them the' 
jobs, the Clerks would file a claim. The employer sought to enjoin the Board from pro? 
ceeding until the Clerks had been notified and made parties to the proceeding so that any 
award would be binding on both unions. Frankfurter, writing for the Court, denied relief 
on the ground that since the award might be against the Telegraphers, there was no show? 
ing of injury. He seemed unconcerned that this was all part of an agreement between the 
Telegraphers and the Clerks not to intervene in each other's proceedings, but to pursue 
their ciaims independently?apparently to exploit the chance that both would get back pay 
awards from separate referees. 
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practical competence of the Court to deal with problems which require adjust? 
ment of conflicting interests. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's appeal to these basic principles creates a form of 
rigidity, for they do not suggest exceptions or variations. The rules for avoid? 
ing constitutional issues become absolutes to be followed with equal strictness 
in all situations. The Court's function in determining constitutionality is the 
same for laws limiting hours as for laws limiting speech. The judge's function 
in interpreting a National Labor Relations Act is no different from his function 
in interpreting a negotiable instruments law. Although Frankfurter at times 
recognizes that the greatness of Marshall rests on his meeting the special 
needs of his day, he would seem to seek standards to guide the Court at all 
times. To allow variations would be to undercut the principles on which 
judicial restraint is based and open the door to judicial willfulness. 
Unfortunately, our political system falls short of perfect democracy. Our 
system functions satisfactorily only because we have developed practices, in? 
stitutions and traditions to fill its gaps and patch its weaknesses. One of the 
institutions on which we rely to protect us against our self-destructiveness 
and to fill the legislative gaps is the Court. To shrink the functions of the 
Court by appeal to principles which have only a half-measure of reality may 
impede instead of further government's ability to meet the felt needs of society. 
To measure a judge's role according to that which can be safely entrusted 
to puny men is to reduce the whole Court to a pageant acted by bit players. 
Neither the Constitution, our traditions nor our existing structure treats the 
Court so casually. Judicial humility does not demand asceticism but suggests 
that judges meet the responsibilities which the system of their day requires. 
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